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Block Grants, Early Childhood Education, 
and the Reauthorization of Head Start: 
From Positional Conflict to Interest-Based 
------------------ -Agreement . . . . -- --- - - --- - - ... 
Eloise Pasachoff* 
In early 2003, the Bush administration proposed and Congress 
considered two types of highly controversial structural reform to Head 
Start, the federal program that since 1965 has provided early education 
and comprehensive . health and social services to low-income 
preschoolers and their families. I First, the proposal would begin funding 
Head Start through federal block grants to the states rather than through 
direct federal grants to local agencies.2 Second, the proposal would shift 
oversight of Head Start at the federal level from the Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) to the Department of Education 
(ED).3 Variations on these two proposals have been offered many times 
since Head Start was created, and each time Head Start advocates have 
successfully lobbied against them.4 This time is no different: neither the 
version of the reauthorization bill approved by the House in September 
2005 nor the version of the bill currently awaiting consideration by the 
* Law Clerk to the Hon. Robert A. Katzmann, United States Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit, 2005-2006; Law Clerk to the Hon. Jed S. Rakoff, United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York, 2004-2005. J.D. Harvard Law 
School, 2004; M.P.A. Kennedy School of Government, 2004; M.A. Yale University, 
1 998; A.B. Harvard College, 1995 .  The Hewlett Fellowship in Law and Negotiation 
provided research support for this project. Many thanks to Martha Minow, Frank Sander, 
Bob Bordone, and the many professionals in the fields of Head Start, early education, and 
consensus building who took time away from their own work to be interviewed for this 
project. The views here represented are my own, and the responsibility for any errors lies 
with me. 
1 .  See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., President Bush's 
Plan to Prepare Children for Kindergarten (Feb. 3, 2003), available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2003pres/20030203.html [hereinafter Press Release, 
DHHS). 
2. See id. 
3. See id. 
4. See infra Section I. 
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Senate contains either of these structural refonns.5 
That these proposed refonns are no longer under active 
consideration has been held out as a victory by Head Start advocates, led 
by the National Head Start Association (NHSA) and joined by a variety 
of other advocacy organizations. This article questions that conclusion, 
and instead argues that Head Start advocates would do well to reconsider 
their long-held opposition to both changes. Much of the opposition to ----�� - - .. -�- . .  · � ��- � -these changes stems from reflexlve �ieaction-anda-hIstory o-fmrs-trus-i � 
instead of dispassionate policy analysis. The policy needs and doctrinal 
context that led to the original structure of the program-for example, 
the need to bypass racist state governors who were willing to close down 
school systems to avoid integration, in an environment of almost 
Hmitl�ss J�deral . all11iQIity . . to crea.te civil. rights l�gisla.ti():n-are 
increasingly out of place in today's world. In fact, Head Start is now an 
outlier with respect to other social welfare and education programs, 
which are largely funded by the federal government through block grants 
to the states; educational authorities are now turning towards 
comprehensive service delivery models that are the hallmark of Head 
Start programs; and the Supreme Court has sharply curtailed the 
atmospherics of limitless federal power in which context Head Start was 
created.6 
This article proceeds in four parts. Section I traces the history of the 
conflict over proposals to change Head Start's fundirig and 
organizational structure. I conclude that the dispute cannot easily be 
reduced to partisan politics and that the substance of the opposition has 
changed very little over the years, even though the particular proposals 
for structural change have been quite different. Section II examines the 
policy and doctrinal changes relevant to Head Start over the last forty 
years, arguing that the needs and expectations of the 1965 program have 
a very different resonance in the new millennium. Section III considers 
why the advocates have been so resistant to structural change, given 
these changed circumstances. The literature on negotiation theory and 
practice offers a helpful lens. through which to analyze the problem, 
especially in the literature's distinction between positions-the particular 
and opposing outcomes to which each side stakes a claim-and 
interests-the underlying reasons why each side finds its desired 
outcome appealing. I explore the benefits of paying attention to interests 
over positions, the perils of focusing on narrow positions, and the 
barriers to an interest-based process. Finally, Section IV proposes a way 
forward, offering an inclusive and. participatory consensus-based process 
5. See infra notes 86-95, 1 37-38 and accompanying text. 
6. See infra Section II. 
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to help the parties consider and respond to the underlying interests 
behind their positions. The article concludes that an honest assessment 
of the role of Head Start in the country's early childhood education and 
care movement could lead to structural experimentation that would 
benefit all concerned. 
To view the absence of the proposals for structural change in the 
________ � ______ � __ �� __ yJ!ITentyersjQn�LJlfJh�_ realJlQoJi2;atiQllbill_as __ cLyicJJ)l1'-,_J)I_1Qyie_w_tbe_ __ .. _ . .  _ _  _ 
proposals themselves as no longer relevant, would be short-sighted. 
History suggests both that the proposals will come around again and that 
the battle over the proposals has repercussions for the rest of the debate 
over reauthorization, and indeed for the success of Head Start itself. It is 
therefore important to understand the most recent battle in its historical 
contextand-to explore ways to change the dynamics of the debate. 
Attention to the context of this conflict through the lens of negotiation 
theory and practice has the potential to do more for Head Start and the 
field of early childhood education and care in general than the 
apocalyptic, limited terms of this current round of battles would suggest. 
I. Background to the Current Conflict: Disputes over Head Start's 
Funding and Organizational Structure, 1965 to the Present 
A. Funding Structure: Federal-Local or Block Grant to the States? 
The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 created the federal Office 
of Economic Opportunity (OED), ushering in President Johnson's War 
on Poverty, a series of federal initiatives designed to attack poverty at its 
roots.7 Head Start opened in the summer of 1965 as one of these 
initiatives, having moved from idea to implementation in little more than 
six months.8 The federal government provided funding directly to the 
local organizations that would run Head Start centers, bypassing state 
and local government, largely because Head Start's founders believed 
that these lower levels of government were impediments rather than aids 
in solving the problems of poverty, especially where minorities were 
concerned.9 The founders were reluctant to let anti-poverty funding flow 
through the hands of racist state officials who had closed or threatened to 
7. See EDWARD ZIGLER & SUSAN M UENCHOW, HEAD START: THE INSIDE STORY OF 
AMERICA'S MOST SUCCESSFUL EDUCATIONAL EXPERIMENT 2 ( 1 992); Edward Zigler & 
Karen Anderson, An Idea Whose Time Had Come: The Intellectual and Political Climate 
for Head Start, in PROJECT HEAD START: A LEGACY OF THE WAR ON POVERTY 3, 5 
(Edward Zigler & Jeannette Valentine, eds. ,  1 979). 
8. See ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 7, at 7-55, for a description of this 
planning period. 
9. See, e.g., Carolyn Harmon & Edward J. Hanley, Administrative Aspects of the 
Head Start Program in PROJECT HEAD START, supra note 7, at 379, 385.  
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close public school systems rather than integrate them.10 Additionally, 
the founders wanted to root Head Start directly in local communities to 
underscore the importance of individual and community empowerment, 
one of the missions of the War on Poverty. 11 
The funding structure of the program has changed very little since 
1965. There are currently ten regional offices of the federal agency that 
. _ _  .nms.Rel:td __ S.tart,_.and_granLapplications.and-renewals-- gothrough-.the .. -­
regional office assigned to that applicant or grantee. 12 The federal 
government provides eighty percent of the total funding for the program, 
with a twenty percent match covered by the grantee. 13 A grantee may 
operate. its own Head Start program directly, or it may entrust the 
operation of a program to a delegate agency.I4 In the 2005 fiscal year, 
the last year for which complete figures are available, Head Start served 
just over 9 00,000 children in almost 50,000 classrooms thr01.lgh 1 ,604 
grantees, with a total budget of $6.8 billion dollars. 15 
This funding structure stands in contrast to that of Community 
Action Programs, another War on Poverty initiative, which are funded 
through the Community Services Block Grant directly to the states, 
which then disburse the funding to grantees themselves.I6 Much federal 
funding for elementary and secondary education runs the same way, 
through the state departments of education. 17 Federal funding for child 
care programs, a much newer endeavor that dates only to 1990, similarly 
moves through the Child Care and Development Block Grant to state 
administrators.I8 Despite numerous efforts over the years to change the 
funding structure of Head Start to parallel the block grant structure that is 
1 0. See. e.g., JEFFREY A. RAFFEL, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF SCHOOL SEGREGATION 
AND DESEGREGATION: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 3 1 -35, 1 04-05, 270-72 (1998); 
KENNETH J. MEIER, JOSEPH STEWART, JR., & ROBERT E. ENGLAND, RACE, CLASS, AND 
EDUCATION: THE POLITICS OF SECOND-GENERATION DISCRIMINATION 46-47 ( 1 989), for 
more on the story of state governmental official response to school desegregation. 
I I . See Zigler & Anderson, supra note 7, at 6. 
1 2. See, e.g., VALORA WASHINGTON & URA JEAN OYEMADE BAILEY, PROJECT HEAD 
START: MODELS AND STRATEGIES FOR THE TWENTy-FIRST CENTURY 26-3 1 ( 1 995). 
13. Id. at3l. 
14. See Harmon & Hanley, supra note 9, at 380, for a useful chart. 
1 5. See Head Start Bureau, Head Start Program Fact Sheet (Mar. 2006), available at 
http://www.acf. h s.gov/programs/hsb/researchJ2006.htm. While the number of children 
served has not quite doubled since the program opened in 1 965 with half a million 
children, funding has increased almost seventy-fold, from $96 million in 1 965. See 
WASHINGTON & BAILEY, supra note 12, at 1 06-07, 1 1 5 .  This disproportionate increase of 
funding as compared to children reveals that, in the debate over whether to serve more 
children with fewer services or fewer children with more services, the latter view has 
prevailed. See id. 
1 6. See Community Services Block Grant, 42 U .S.c. §§ 990 1 ,  9904 (2006). 
1 7. See, e.g., Elementary and Secondary Education Block Grant, 20 U .S .C. §§ 380 1 -
3876 (2006). 
1 8. See Child Care and Development Block Grant, 42 U.S.c. § 9801 (2006). 
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common in other social service and education programs, the federal-local 
structure of Head Start has remained unchanged from its 1965 
conception.19 
A useful way of understanding these two types of funding structures 
is to contrast what Harmon and Hanley call "the classical accountability 
model" with "the recipient-participant model.,,20 In the classical 
... accountahilit}Lmodel,.funding.andpolicy. direction.flow.from.the.-federal· .... 
government to state and local governments through formulas linked to 
state demographics; each layer of government is accountable to the one 
above it.21 There is generally a uniform program design and a focus on 
monitoring individual programs to make sure they comply with that 
design.22 This model is expected to achieve accountability. through 
public officials who represent the entire citizenry;73 This is the model 
that matches the block grant structure. In contrast, in the recipient­
participant model, federal funding is directed to local organizations 
outside the government.24 Policy and direction are shared between the 
federal government and these local bodies, and funds are disbursed based 
on the assessed needs of recipients rather than on strict demographic 
formulas.2s Program recipients are connected to policymaking decisions, 
and program variance rather than uniformity is expected.26 
Accountability is achieved through monitoring compliance with local 
needs and decisions, on the theory that recipient satisfaction indicates 
acceptable use of government funds.27 It is an overstatement to identify 
Head Start as a program purely in the recipient-participant vein, since the 
federal government has directed policy and set requirements from the 
start.28 But more than the classical accountability model, the recipient­
participant model matches the funding structure of Head Start as 
originally conceived.29 
While the War on Poverty generally and Head Start in particular 
were geared towards this latter model, the model had its detractors from 
the start.30 Efforts to change Head Start's funding structure to match the 
classical accountability model began almost immediately. In 1968, a 
1 9. See infra Section II.A for more on the growing predominance of block grants in 
policy areas connected to Head Start. 
20. Harmon & Hanley, supra note 9, at 3 83-85. 
2 1 .  ld. at 383 .  
22. /d. 
23. /d. at 3 84. 
24. ld. 
25.  /d. 
26. Harmon & Hanley, supra note 9, at 3 84. 
27. /d. 
28. ld. at 386. 
29. [d. 
30. See id. at 385. 
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congressional effort to block grant Head Start almost succeeded when the 
Senate passed an amendment that would have reallocated money 
earmarked for Head Start to the states, requiring only that the money be 
used to support early childhood programs.3 1 When Richard Orton, the 
federal administrator of Head Start, learned of a similar proposal about to 
be introduced in the House, he triggered a national telephone campaign 
.... to __ Congress .. with_calls.opposing.the_amendment. 3� The-amendmenLwas 
never introduced in the House, and the Senate proposal went nowhere.33 
In 1970, Nixon administration officials began floating the idea of 
block granting Head Start as part of the President's New Federalism 
initiative.34 Donald Rumsfeld, then the head of the Office of Economic 
Opportunity (and from 2001 to 2006 President George W. Bush's 
Secretary of Defense), prepared a memo for senior administration 
officials arguing that federal grant programs were inefficiently run and 
recommending that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) move 
to decentralize such programs in the next budget cycle.35 As a federal 
grant program that dealt only with individual grantees rather than the 
states, the federal-local structure of Head Start seemed in jeopardy, if not 
all of Head Start itself. When Nixon's new administrator for Head Start, 
Edward Zigler, had one of his first meetings with OMB representatives, 
he was shocked to read a proposal for Head Start's future: "Phase out 
one-third of Head Start the first year, one-third the second year, and 
eliminate the entire program the third.,,36 OMB's decentralization of 
federal programs, likely to include Head Start, was thus linked to 
dismantling Head Start entirely. Further, the timing of these proposals 
coincided with the release of the first formal evaluation of Head Start, 
which concluded that Head Start participation had no lasting cognitive 
effect on children.37 The longstanding suspicion of Head Start advocates 
3 1 .  See ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 7 ,  at 1 75 .  
32. !d. 
33. !d. 
34. !d. at 8 1 .  See generally TIMOTHY CONLAN, FROM NEW FEDERALISM TO 
DEVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL REFORM 19-92 ( 1 998), for 
more on President Nixon's New Federalism initiative. 
35. ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 7, at 8 1 .  OMB is the executive branch agency 
that prepares the president's budget proposals and coordinates policy among the other 
agencies. See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, http://www. hitehouse.gov/omb/ 
organizationlrole.html (last visited Oct. 2 1 , 2006). 
36. ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 7, at 80. 
37. !d. at 65-72; PROJECT HEAD START, supra note 7, at 391 . See, e.g., Debate 1I: 
Does Head Start Work?, in EDWARD ZIGLER & SALLY J. STYFCO, THE HEAD START 
DEBATES 1 1 1 -278 (2004); Part V: Evaluation of the Head Start Program, in PROJECT 
HEAD START, supra note 7, at 399·507, for more on the evaluation of Head Start, 
including critiques of the methodology used in this first evaluation and discussions of 
later, more nuanced evaluations. See also WASHINGTON & BAILEY, supra note 12, at 1 24-
1 35.  
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that any proposal to decentralize Head Start is connected to ending it 
because it does not work likely stems from this confluence of events. 
This potential decentralization/phase-out of Head Start did not go 
any further, in part due to three separate strategies to counter it. First, 
Zigler embarked on a campaign to promote and publicize Head Start's 
strengths and to attribute this positive view of Head Start to the 
--presidentiaLadministration .. itself.�8_$econd,Ziglerworked_onsol�ingJhe. 
administrative problems that made Head Start vulnerable to accurate 
criticism.39 Finally, on-the-ground activism by Head Start parents, of 
which Zigler was occasionally a target as part of the Nixon 
administration, may have helped keep the program in place. Therefore, 
Nixon's gesture towards decentralizing Head Start did not get far. 
Atthe sametime,however;· a fight was brewing in . Congress over 
how to expand Head Start into a broader vision of national child care, a 
battle in which Head Start's funding structure played a major role. The 
proposed solution was the Comprehensive Child Development Act of 
1971. 40 This Act, which stated explicit! y that it was intended to lay the 
groundwork for universal child care, would have created a national 
network of federally funded child care centers, for which Head Start 
would serve as the model; defined federal standards for the quality of 
care; and provided federal funds to purchase child care facilities and to 
train caregivers.41 Although both the House and Senate versions of the 
bill were introduced by Democrats, the bills gained the cosponsorship of 
a wide number of prominent Republicans and received wide bipartisan 
support.42 The key difference between the House and Senate versions of 
the bills, and the difference that ultimately spelled the Act's doom, was 
the contrast between funding structures.43 The Sena�e version would 
have maintained the federal-local funding structure of the Head Start 
model, thus retaining federal control, on the theory that this structure 
would distribute the most money to the programs themselves.44 A 
coalition of Head Start, child care, and civil rights advocates emphasized 
that they could support only a bill with this funding structure.45 In 
contrast, the House version would have created a system of "prime 
sponsorship," where states and cities with populations of over 500,000 
could have been the direct recipients of federal money and could then 
38.  ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 7, at 82-85. 
39. Id. at 89-94; Hannon & Hanley, supra note 9, at 392-94. 
40. ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 7, at 1 23-24. 
4 1 .  [d. 
42. /d. at 1 24-28, 1 36. 
43. Id. at 1 27-28, 1 37-38. 
44. /d. at 1 38. 
45. /d. at 1 38, 1 43 .  
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have disbursed funding locally, both to streamline administrative 
oversight and because Republicans in the House had indicated that they 
would be willing to go along with only this funding structure.46 
The Nixon administration would have supported the House limit of 
500,000, and it has been suggested that it might even have supported the 
100,000 limit that was in place when the bill made it out of 
sub_c_ornmitte_e. 47 BuL_aflooLamendmenLto�reduce the- -limit-to a 
population of 10,000 for prime sponsorship went too far, as did the 
House and Senate conference committee's ultimate reduction of the 
prime sponsorship population requirement to 5,000.48 While both the 
Senate and the House passed the bill, bipartisan support had largely 
evaporated, and President Nixon ultimately vetoed the bill with a ringing 
condemnation of federal . involvement· inchildcare--condemnation that 
he may not have actually felt but that seemed politically expedient, once 
Republican support for the bill had disappeared.49 That the question of 
funding structure brought down this major piece of legislation that had 
seemed like it would easily become law points to the salience of the 
disagreement. 
The Nixon administration's interest in block granting Head Start 
was piqued again briefly in 1974, through contact made by Jimmy 
Carter, then the governor of Georgia. That year, pursuant to 
congressional legislation, OMB published a circular that explained a new 
opportunity for states to help coordinate their federally funded social 
service programs, an opportunity that exemplified the decentralized 
approach defining Nixon's New Federalism.50 Carter wrote to OMB 
requesting authority under this circular to control Georgia's Head Start 
programs.51 Internal maneuvering by Head Start's federal 
administrators, who were advocates of the federal·local structure, 
resulted in a swift rejection of this request. 52 When Governor Carter 
became President Carter, he made no further attempt to tum over control 
of Head Start to the states. 53 
After President Reagan took office in 1980, his administration 
began to discuss block granting Head Start. 54 Proponents of block 
granting-including, this time, Head Start's new federal 
administrators-felt that it was inefficient for the federal government to 
46. ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 7, at 137. 
47. Id. at 141-43.  
48. !d. at 144-45 . 
49. Id. at 146-47. 
50. Id. 
5 1 .  Id. 
52. ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 7. at 176-77. 
53 .  See id. at 178-84 (describing President Carter's efforts to restructure Head Start). 
54. !d. at 194. 
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run so many local programs and that turning the program over to the 
states might enable them to serve more children with no budget 
increase. 55 Streamlining Head Start's thick book of program regulations 
would also fit in with the President's move towards federal 
deregulation. 56 The President was expected to propose incorporating 
Head Start's funding into the Community Services Block Grant-
.. - --although-the-ea1'lllafked.funding.fof-Head-.. Startwould-be consequently -. 
cut by $ 130 million.57 When some members of Congress who opposed 
block granting learned about this proposal, however, they leaked it to the 
press, who responded negatively,58 and the Reagan administration 
eventually received over 5,000 letters opposing block grants. 59 
Responding to these pressures, the administration never made a formal 
proposaitoCongress to revise Head Start's formalfunding-structure;6o 
By the mid-l 980s, Head Start had entered what would be a 
relatively long period of structural stability, and the program enjoyed 
strong bipartisan support.61 In 1988, both the Democratic and 
Republican candidates for president campaigned on the issue of who 
supported Head Start more strongly, and both parties proposed to extend 
Head Start services to all eligible children.62 Congress's reauthorization 
of Head Start in 1990 included a major boost in Head Start's budget.63 
The program continued to expand under President Clinton with no sign 
of anything but a commitment to maintaining Head Start as a federal­
local program.64 After the congressional election of 1994 turned control 
over Congress to the Republicans, and devolving federal welfare 
programs to the states emerged as an important item on the agenda, Head 
Start was briefly on the list for consolidation with other low-income 
social service programs into a block grant.65 However, the proposal to 
include Head Start did not go very far.66 By the time President George 
55. Id. Cj text at supra note I S . 
56. WASHINGTON & BAILEY, supra note 1 2, at 1 06. See CONLAN, supra note 34, at 
93-2 1 2, for an overview of President Reagan's plans for and implementation of federal 
deregulation (which was also connected to cutting federal funds). 
57. ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 7, at 1 95 .  
58. !d. at 1 94-95. 
59 . WASHINGTON & BAILEY, supra note 1 2, at 1 06. 
60. ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 7, at 1 95-99. 
6 1 .  See, e.g., Judith A .  Chafel & Heather L. Sugioka, Head Start: A Decade of 
Challenge and Change, in THE HEAD START DEBATES, supra note 37, at 309- 1 3  
(describing bipartisan efforts to increase funding for Head Start without proposals for 
major structural change). 
62. Id. at 2 10. 
63. WASHINGTON & BAILEY, supra note 1 2, at 1 07-08. 
64. See Chafel & Sugioka, supra note 6 1 .  
65. CONLAN, supra note 34, at 280. 
66. Id. 
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W. Bush took office in 2001, Head Start was serving just over 850,000 
children with a budget of almost $5.3 billion, in the same federal-local 
structure that it had since its inception.67 The latest iteration of the block 
grant wars was about to emerge. 
President Bush made clear from the early days of his presidential 
campaign his interest in significantly changing the structure of Head 
_Start.�8 _ When hefinall¥released his-proposaLin-Eebruat"¥ 2003 to. tum 
over control of Head Start to interested states and to move Head Start's 
federal administration from HHS to the ED, no one was surprised. The 
block grant element of President Bush's proposal would have allowed 
any state to submit an application to the Secretaries of both HHS and ED 
for state "coordinat[ion of] preschool programs including Head Start.,,69 
The applications would include 
a plan outlining how [states] will: work with the public school 
system to develop goals for all preschool programs in the state; 
identify guidelines that preschool programs can use to achieve these 
goals; devise an accountability system to detennine whether children 
are achieving the goals; provide professional development for 
preschool teachers and administrators; and help parents provide 
support for children to succeed in kindergarten. In addition, states 
must describe how they will maintain the range of child development 
goals of Head Start, including the provision of social, parental, and 
health services in their Head Start programs.70 
The President's proposal offered two central rationales for turning 
over control of Head Start to the states. First, state control would better 
allow the state to integrate Head Start with its other programs serving 
low-income children and families, especially child care and other 
prekindergarten programs. This would promote efficiency and better 
programmatic management and oversight. 71 Second, especially after 
President Bush's education initiative No Child Left Behind (NeLB), 
states should have the responsibility for the first step of education 
because states are ultimately held responsible for the education of their 
children.72 
The day after the President's proposal was announced, the NHSA 
issued its own press release opposing the plan, saying the changes would 
67. Head Start Bureau, Head Start Program Fact Sheet, supra note 1 5 . 
68. See Edward Zigler, Editorial, The Wrong Read on Head Start, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
23, 2000, at A I 9. 
69. Press Release, DHHS, supra note 1 .  
70. !d. 
7 1 .  !d. 
72. !d. 
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destroy the program.73 Although the Bush proposal itself never actually 
used the term "block grant," the NHSA invoked the term as implicit in 
state control. 74 Block granting, said the NHSA, would result in a 
devastating loss of the comprehensive nature of the program. The NHSA 
argued that state-run child care and prekindergarten programs do not 
have the family-centered, whole-child approach that the Head Start 
___�R�Qg�am<loe�,_§QJh� __ l!11jqt.l� __ !J.an:tr�()r _ _  Ii�ad __ S!l:lI1: .... __ '\\'Clul<.l J:>� 
compromised.75 The NHSA further argued that shifting this important 
program to the states during a time of budget crises is not a wise move 
because there would be too much temptation either to use too much 
money in overhead or to serve too many children not as wel1.76 They 
pointed to a recent study finding that federal dollars are eight times more 
likely than state dollars to target disadvantaged children, exactly the 
population served by Head Start.77 Further, they noted that Head Start 
services provided to Indian tribes and to the families of seasonal and 
migrant workers would be "in great jeopardy" under a structure that gave 
control to the states.78 Finally, the NHSA demonstrated a lack of trust of 
the motives for block granting the program, saying that the real goal of 
the block granting initiative was Head Start's ultimate destruction.79 
As the House and Senate began discussions on Head Start's 
reauthorization, the NHSA began an intensive lobbying campaign 
opposing the President's proposals.8o One representative noted that his 
office had never received as much feedback from his constituents as he 
had on this bill. 8 I The NHSA also sought the support of the press, 
hoping to use widespread media coverage around the country to its 
advantage. On July 25, 2003, in a dramatic late-night session, the House 
of Representatives passed by one vote a much narrower version of the 
administration's proposal; instead of block grants available to all fifty 
states, the House version would create a pilot program limited to eight 
73. NHSA, Legislative Alert: President Announces Plan to Move Head Start to 
Department of Education, Says States Should Get Chance to Run Programs: NHSA Calls 
For Immediate Action! (Feb. 4, 2003), http://www.nhsa.org/members/advocacy/ 







79. NHSA, Legislative Alert, supra note 73.  
80. Jd. See also ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 7, at 1 75;  PROJECT HEAD START, 
supra note 7, at 1 30. 
8 1 .  School Readiness Act of 2003, H.R. 22 1 0, 1 08th Congo (2003). See Bill 
Swindell & Kate Schuler, Scaled-Back Head Start Bill a Squeaker Win for GOP, CQ 
WEEKLY, luI. 26, 2003, at 1 895. 
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Advocates saw in this narrow House victory an opportunity to shut 
down the proposal in the Senate, and several senators were quoted 
immediately after the House vote saying they would reject any attempt to 
block grant Head Start.83 By the time the Senate began to consider its 
version of the reauthorization bill, even the House's proposed pilot 
___ _ _____ _ _  P�Qgr-'1.ffi9L�!aJ�sQntroLh�g_�j_S�IJR_�_<!l"�(1 ... _  QXL _Q(;1QQ�[ �JL �QQ3,_ Jh� 
Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions (HELP) Committee, 
which oversees Head Start, voted unanimously across party lines for 
draft legislation that rejected any attempt to block grant the program. 84 
The Senate version included instead a proposal to create 200 "centers of 
excellence," which would help states coordinate their preschool services, 
including Head Start.8s While the NHSA eventually accepted the basic 
concept of the centers of excellence, it continued to object to any 
involvement of state governors in assessing which Head Start grantees 
. have merit.86 On May 23, 2005, the Senate HELP Committee favorably 
reported a bill that included the centers of excellence, and the bill was 
placed on the Senate Legislative Calendar on August 31, 2005.87 
In the meantime, the House sponsor of the original bill with the 
controversial pilot program provision expressed some willingness to drop 
that aspect if necessary to move forward.88 Following through on that 
suggestion, the House sponsor introduced a new bill on May 5, 2005, 
excluding this proposal. 89 The House Committee on Education and the 
Workforce favorably reported this bill on June 16, 2005, and the bill 
passed the full House by a vote of 231 to 184 on September 22, 2005.90 
82. See Swindell & Schuler, supra note 8 1 ,  at 1 895. The vote was delayed from a 
previously scheduled July 1 8  vote because Republican leadership had known that many 
of the bill 's supporters would be absent on that day. Id. The July 25th vote was obtained 
only after then-Majority Leader Tom DeLay sent for a House member who had been 
injured several days before in a car accident and was on bedrest, and it was after midnight 
when the final vote was cast. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. See Bill Swindell, Party Differences Over Head Start Belie Unanimous Vote in 
Senate Committee, CQ WEEKLY, Nov. 1 , 2003, at 2706. 
85. Id. 
86. NHSA, Position Paper: Our View of the u.s. Senate Head Start Reauthorization 
Bill, S. 1940, Apr. 7, 2004, at 3-4, available at http://www.nhsa.org/research/ 
research_re_res_articles.htm. 
87. See S. REp. No. 1 09- 1 3 1 ,  at 4, 37-38 (2005); see also Head Start Improvements 
for School Readiness Act, S. 1 1 07, 1 09th Congo (2005), http://thomas. loc.gov/ (last 
accessed Oct. 23, 2006), to search for the bill's status. 
88. See Swindell, supra note 84, at 2706. 
89. Bill Swindell, 2005 Legislative Summary; Head Start Reauthorization, CQ 
WEEKLY, Jan. 2, 2006, at 33 [hereinafter Swindell, 2005 Legislative Summary]; see also 
School Readiness Act of 2005, H.R. 2123, 1 09th Congo (2005), http://thomas.loc.gov/ 
(last accessed Oct. 23, 2006), to search for the bill 's status. 
90. See H.R. 2 1 23, 1 09th Congo (2005), http://thomas.loc.gov/ (last accessed Oct. 
HeinOnline - - 1 1 1  Penn S t . L. Rev. 3 6 0  2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 7  
2006] BLOCK, GRANTS, EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATION 36 1 
With House insistence on the pilot program gone, reconciliation between 
the House and Senate versions of the bill seems more likely, and a 
reauthorized Head Start may, after three years of debate, finally be on the 
horizon.91 
With the story of the block grant wars thus brought up to date, it is 
important to note the effect that history had on the NHSA's response to 
_ _  Pre�c.l�I1L J:ll!�ll'�_QrQQQ�a.I, Whi<;h cii ff�J."t!(ifr()rrLQ!"e�i()lls . _(It!e!!1pt�_!() 
block grant Head Start in several key respects. First, while the 1968 
proposal to block grant Head Start would have folded the program's 
funding into a general grant to the states with no specifics beyond a 
requirement that the money be used for early childhood education,92 
President Bush's proposal would have required states to submit for 
approval detailed plans of how they would spend the money.93 The 
proposal would additionally have required that the state plans provide "at 
a minimum, the same coverage to serve at least as many Head Start 
eligible" children as under the current system, "including social, family, 
and health services," a requirement that differs from previous attempts to 
water down the program.94 Further, in contrast to the Reagan proposal, 
which was linked both to budget cuts and the ultimate deregulation of the 
program,95 the Bush proposal and its House counterpart required states to 
match their federal funds by at least fifty percent, with no mention of 
budget cuts, and to "generally meet or exceed" current federal 
standards.96 This proposal thus had certain safeguards that were lacking 
in previous proposals. It is certainly possible that the proposals for state 
control would weaken Head Start's mandate, but the response of the 
advocates relied on old arguments that had worked to shut down block 
grants before without differentiating this proposal from earlier attempts. 
While neither side mentioned the history of the block grant wars, it is 
easy to see how advocates traced the roots of this proposal to earlier 
versions and saw danger ahead. 
Yet it is also possible to see how advocates may have overstated the 
issue. As later parts of this article demonstrate, it is possible to imagine 
more state involvement in Head Start programs in ways that support 
rather than undercut the program's objectives. In particular, as some 
impartial policy analysts observed at the time, a narrow, short-term pilot 
23, 2006), to search for the bill's status. 
9 1 .  See Swindell, 2005 Legislative Summary, supra note 89. While other differences 
between the House and Senate bills still require resolution, the absence of the block grant 
proposal in the House version removes a crucial stumbling block. See id. 
92. See ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 7, at 1 75.  
93. See Press Release, DHHS, supra note 1 .  
94. Id. 
95. ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 7 ,  at 1 94-95. 
96. Press Release, DHHS, supra note 1 ;  Swindell & Schuler, supra note 8 1  at 1 895. 
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program for more state control, such as that proposed in the first House 
bill, could have been a relatively low-risk way to explore whether 
different structures could benefit program participants.97 Before 
examining this possibility further, I turn to the second major structural 
change proposed by the Bush administration: moving federal oversight 
of the program from the Department of Health and Human Services to 
the Department of Education. 
B. Organizational Structure: Department of Health and Human 
Services or Department of Education? 
Since neither HHS nor ED existed in its current fonn when Head 
Start was created, the fonnal aspect of this debate is relatively new. 
However, the cehtra:l dispute that lies behind it-· whether Head Start 
should be a narrowly tailored education program or a broad-based 
comprehensive social service program-has a long history. 
Head Start originated in the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) 
as the brainchild of that office's director, Sargent Shriver, and the team 
of professionals he pulled together to create the program.98 Shriver and 
his team designed Head Start as a comprehensive program, providing 
much more than a preschool program to ease poor children's transition to 
schoo1.99 The fourteen-person planning committee put in place in 
December 1964 contained only two early childhood educators among its 
physicians, clinical and research psychologists, and academics and 
university administrators in the fields of nursing, social work, and 
education. 100 Only one of the committee's original seven 
recommendations for Head Start focused on developing academic skills; 
the other six focused on physical and mental health, emotional and social 
development, and parent and family involvement and integration.lOI The 
committee purposely avoided defining Head Start as an educational 
97. See Ron Haskins & Isabel Sawhill, The Future of Head Start, Policy Brief No. 
27 (Brookings Inst. 2003) (recommending that Congress create a five-state pilot 
program). 
98. PROJECT HEAD START, supra note 7, at 36, 1 14- 1 6; see also SCOTT STOSSEL, 
SARGE: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF SARGENT SHRIVER 4 1 7-2 1 (2004). 
99. See PROJECT HEAD START, supra note 7, at 73. See II: The Preschool-Education 
Component of Head Start, in PROJECT HEAD START, supra note 7, at 1 53-228; Ill: Head 
Start as a Comprehensive Developmental Program, in PROJECT HEAD START, supra note 
7, at 229-336, for more on the educational components and comprehensive components 
of Head S tart. 
1 00. ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 7 at 8, 1 8, 42 . See PROJECT HEAD START, 
supra note 7, at 72- 1 14, for individual reminiscences from the members of this planning 
committee. 
1 0 1 .  PROJECT HEAD START, supra note 7, at 1 37; ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 7, 
at 1 8- 1 9. 
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program and linking Head Start to the school system, which they saw as 
enforcing racial segregation and traditional patterns of economic power, 
as well as lacking in the comprehensive effort they believed to be key to 
conquering poverty. 102 The committee called for Head Start to remain in 
the OEO only until it demonstrated its effectiveness, at which time it 
should be moved to a cabinet-level department.lo3 
_ _Wbil�Jh.e .. p.l1u:mil1gcQJl:lmitte�hadJ!KUS�d_Qn deyelilp.ing.Head. 
Start as a comprehensive program, Head Start ended up being publicized 
as a program designed primarily to bolster poor children's IQs, in part 
because this was easy for the public and politicians to understand and 
support. 104 This initial focus on IQ scores likely contributed to early 
congressional attempts to transfer Head Start to the Office of Education, 
.--overthestrenuousobjections of Head Start's federal administrators. 105 
An early version of this congressional effort took place in 1967, though 
the sponsoring senator stressed the problems with Head Start's current 
fiscal management rather than any benefit that would come from running 
the program through the school systems.106 That attempt, like most that 
would follow, never made it out of committee, and Head Start remained 
in the OEO.107 
Shortly after President Nixon took office, he announced his 
intention to move Head Start to the Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare (HEW), the predecessor agency of both HHS and ED. lOS 
Some took this proposal as a sign of President Nixon's approval of the 
program, since only successful programs were supposed to move out of 
the OEO, and since Nixon had expressed distaste for many OEO 
programs. 109 The administration created a new agency in HEW, the 
Office of Child Development (OeD), in which Head Start was placed. I 10 
1 02. ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 7, at 1 74. This interest in distancing Head 
Start from the public school system was not unanimous among Head Start's founders; 
Shriver, who had been the head of the Chicago school board for five years, hoped that 
Head Start would bring poor, minority parents into the school system. [d. See also 
PROJECT HEAD START, supra note 7, at 57; Stossel, supra note 98, at 420, for Shriver's 
reminiscences. 
1 03. See PROJECT HEAD START, supra note 7, at 38 1 .  
1 04. See, e.g., ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 7, at 26. 
1 05. See PROJECT HEAD START, supra note 7, at 1 30. 
1 06. See ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 7, at 1 75;  PROJECT HEAD START, supra 
note 7, at 1 30. 
1 07. See ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 7, at 1 75;  PROJECT HEAD START, supra 
note 7, at 1 30. 
1 08 .  WASHINGTON & BAILEY, supra note 1 2, at 26; ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 
7, at 74-75. 
1 09. WASHINGTON & BAILEY, supra note 1 2 ,  at 26; ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 
7, at 74-75. 
110. ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 7, at 74; WASHINGTON & BAILEY, supra note 
1 2, at 27. 
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The director of OCD joined the commissioner of education and 
commissioner of social and rehabilitative services in reporting directly to 
the HEW secretary, a much higher status for Head Start than if Head 
Start's director had been folded into the Office of Education. 1 1 1  The 
placement of Head Start in OCD rather than the Office of Education also 
acknowledged the program's comprehensive focus. 
... When President Carter to.ok office in 1977 , he gave . nCD a . new 
name: the Administration for Children, Youth, and Families (ACYF). 1 I 2 
This name change was not the only change on the horizon for Head Start 
in the Carter administration. President Carter had campaigned on the 
promise of creating a separate cabinet-level Department of Education 
and had been elected with strong support froin the education 10bby.1 J 3 
When President Carter began considering which programs from HEW he 
would propose to move to the new ED, Head Start was originally on the 
list. I 14 OMB proposed, in fact, that almost all social welfare programs 
with any educational component should move to a new Department of 
Education and Human Development, which would link education with 
comprehensive services, including job training, delinquency prevention, 
and Head Start.1 I 5  HEW ' s  jurisdiction would remain limited to Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children, Medicare and Medicaid, and Social 
Security. 1 16 However, OMB cautioned that Head Start should be moved 
only if other human development programs joined it in the ED; otherwise 
Head Start would run the risk of becoming a narrowly focused education 
program itself. I 17 The original vision for the new Education Department, 
then, was to use a wide variety of programs to transform education into a 
broad-based community endeavor, with Head Start as a model. President 
Carter accepted this OMB vision and approved the transfer of Head 
Start. 118 
Despite strong congressional support for the new department,119 a 
major political stumbling block for the ED turned out to be the inclusion 
of Head Start on its list of proposed programs. Recalling the original 
reasons why Head Start had not been linked to the school system in 
1 1 1 . ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 7, at 86. 
1 1 2 .  WASHINGTON & BAILEY, supra note 1 2, at 27. 
1 1 3 .  ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 7 ,  a t  1 78. 
1 1 4. Id. at 1 79-84. 
1 1 5 .  [d. at 1 79. 
1 1 6. !d. 
1 1 7. [d. 
1 1 8. !d. at 1 83 (noting that President "Carter's first elected position had been to a 
school board. He did not see anything wrong with elected officials administering Head 
Start programs. ") . 
1 1 9. ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 7, at 1 83 .  See also D.T. STALLINGS, CTR. FOR 
CHILD AND FAMILY POLICY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, 
1 979-2002 at 5 (Duke Univ. 2002). 
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1 965-the school system' s  perceived racism, inattention to traditionally 
under-served children, and reluctance to provide comprehensive and 
family services-advocates such as the Children's Defense Fund 
threatened to campaign against the department on civil rights grounds, ' a 
response that would have been politically devastating for the 
legislation. 120 In response to claims that Head Start would serve as a 
_. .roD_del _. fQf a revitaliz�d and_ broad .. b_ased educ.ation s)'stem,_ advm�ates 
asked rhetorically how tiny little Head Start could transform the entire 
education system. 121 The NHSA and parents lobbied legislators and staff 
against moving Head Start to the new department, emphasizing the 
school system's inability to deal adequately with the poor and minority 
children served by Head Start.122 The advocates prevailed, and in the 
-- final biU, the -ED contained almost none of the human development 
programs that had originally been slated for it.123 The current debate 
about whether moving Head Start to the ED will result in the loss of its 
comprehensive focus is thus directly related to the Head Start advocates' 
1 977 campaign to keep the ED from being a comprehensive agency; had 
the ED been created with the broad-based mandate that President Carter 
intended, Head Start would seem a natural program to unfold under its 
auspices. 
No attempt was made to move Head Start to the ED under the next 
three presidential administrations, but the proposal was part of the 
current President Bush's original reform plan.124 It is true that the press 
release that announced President Bush's proposal for restructuring Head 
Start never explicitly mentioned completely moving oversight of Head 
Start from HHS to ED; in fact, the only mention of ED is in the shared 
administration of state applications between the secretaries of HHS and 
ED, which at least on its face suggests that some part of the program's 
administration would remain with HHS. 1 25 However, the move to the 
120. ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 7, at 1 73-74, 1 83-85 . Civil rights leaders such 
as Coretta Scott King, Vernon Jordan, Joseph Lowery, and Jesse Jackson also advocated 
that Head Start be left out of the new ED, comparing this fight to the battle against 
segregation. See id. at 1 8 1 .  
1 2 1 .  U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS ., ACYF, HEAD START IN THE 1 980's: 
REVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS 25 ( 1 980) (quoting Marian Wright Edelman as saying 
that it is foolish to assume "that a $735 million program will create the bureaucratic 
leverage to reform a $ 1 7  billion department supporting a $90 billion public school 
system"). 
1 22. ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 7, at 1 85-86. 
1 23. Id. at 186. 
1 24. See supra notes 54-64 and accompanying text (describing President Reagan's 
sole proposal for structural change of Head Start and indicating that the rnid- 1 980s 
through 2000 were years of structural stability for the program); see also Press Release, 
DHHS, supra note 1 .  
125. Press Release, DHHS, supra note 1 .  
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ED was widely acknowledged to be part of President Bush's mission, 
and administration officials linked state success in early education 
programs like Head Start to the President's education initiative, 
NCLB. !26 Officials also emphasized the President's  interest in strongly 
emphasizing literacy skills in Head Start programs, proposing that Head 
Start children face a standardized test to assess the quality of the program 
in teaching these skills. 127 
The Head Start community responded to this element of the 
President' s  proposal negatively: "President Announces Plan to Move 
Head Start to Department of Education. . . .  NHSA calls for Immediate 
Action!,,!28 The NHSA voiced its displeasure with the transfer to the ED 
in now-familiar terms: School programs have never focused on 
comprehensive services . the way that Head Start has, and moving Head 
Start to the ED would be devastating for this element of the program.129 
While over thirty states have preschool programs, the NHSA said, "only 
six required on site case workers to be available, and half did not provide 
regular vision, health, and mental health screenings.,
,1 30 The NHSA also 
pointed out that the school system does not involve parents in the same 
way Head Start does, and expressed skepticism that it ever could.1 3 !  
When the House took up consideration o f  the President's proposal 
in the spring of 2003, intense lobbying against the idea of transferring 
Head Start to the ED led it to be dropped from the bill on which the 
House actually voted in July 2003 . 132 The Senate bill never even 
included this element of the proposal. \ 33 Why was this proposal so easily 
dropped from consideration while the transfer to the states had more 
traction? There is no obvious constituency that supports transferring 
Head Start to the ED. Education advocacy organizations that might have 
stepped behind it have bigger concerns on their horizon, including 
compliance with NCLB, and may not want to expend financial and 
political capital on a matter that does not centrally concern them. Further, 
the fact that some school systems are already running Head Start 
1 26. See Valerie Strauss & Amy Goldstein, Head Start Changeover Proposed; More 
State Control. Literacy Focus Cited, WASH. POST, Feb. 1 ,  2003, at A I ;  Jill S. Gross, 
Changing Head Start: Some Say Revamping Preschool Program Could Threaten Mix of 
Teaching. Services, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 16, 2003, at C l .  
1 27. See David Pierson, Testing Expands to Kids in Head Start, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 6, 
2003, at 16; Valerie Strauss, Head Start Teachers Resist New Training; Sessions on 
Literacy Pushed by Bush, WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 2002, at A3. 
1 28. NHSA, Legislative Alert, supra note 73. 
1 29. See id. 
1 30. Id. 
1 3 1 . !d.; see also Meredith May, Overhaul of Head Start worries some children 's 
advocates, S.F. CHRONICLE, Feb. 27, 2003, at A3. 
1 32 .  Swindell & Schuler, supra note 8 1 .  
1 33 .  Swindell, supra note 84. 
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programs indicates that the education community does not need the 
transfer of Head Start to the ED to become involved. In contrast, the 
transfer of Head Start from federal government control to the states fits 
with a broader ideological preference for state control, a preference with 
a large constituency. 
Because the Senate proposal for state centers of excellence remains 
-a--viable legislative possibility, 134 the proposed transfer of Head Start to 
the ED has, even more than some added fonn of state involvement, died 
in this round of reauthorization. Still, from a policy perspective­
considering without prejudice the value of linking Head Start to schools 
incorporating comprehensive services into educational programs-it is 
not at all clear that keeping Head Start completely separate from the ED 
is best. 
C. Party-Line Politics and the Current Context 
It is tempting to reduce the block grant debates to partisan politics. 
According to this view, the Head Start block grant wars rehearse a 
familiar dispute between the Democrats, who support Head Start's origin 
in the War on Poverty, and the Republicans, who think the federal 
government should get out of the business of running social service 
programs. 135 Indeed, there are some aspects to this charge that are 
realistic. For example, in the long-standing dispute over whether Head 
Start actually works, it is more often Republicans rather than Democrats 
who express doubt or suggest eliminating the program entirely. 136 There 
is no love lost between the Head Start community and Republican Vice 
President Dick Cheney, who voted to cut Head Start when he was a 
legislator in the 1 980s,137 or Donald Rumsfeld, who was behind Nixon 
proposals to restructure and/or eliminate Head Start. 1 38 More 
specifically, the reauthorization bill that passed the House in July 2003 
was generally split along party lines, with no Democrats voting for it. 139 
1 34. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text. 
1 35. See, e.g., Susan Milligan, Bush Budget Would Overhaul Great Society, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Feb. 9, 2003, at A I ;  Nancy Pelosi, House Democratic Leader, Republicans 
Dismantle Head Start, Undermining Aspirations of Working Parents, available at 
http://www.democraticleader.house.gov/issues/educationlhead_start.cfrn. 
1 36. See, e.g., WASHINGTON & BAILEY, supra note 1 2, at 14, 35 ,  1 25-35;  PROJECT 
HEAD START, supra note 7, at 399-5 1 4; Darcy Ann Olsen, It 's Time to Stop Head Start, 
HUMAN EVENTS, Sept. 1 ,  2000, http://www.cato.org/researchieducation/articles/ 
stopheadstart.html (last accessed Aug. 20, 2006); Swindell & Schuler, supra note 8 1 ,  at 
1 895. 
1 37. Jim Provance, Cheney Goes on Defensive Over Old Head Start Vote, 
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Aug. 1 1 , 2000, at A- l 3 . 
1 38.  ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 7, at 8 1 .  
1 39. Swindell & Schuler, supra note 8 1 ,  at 1 895. 
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However, such a view is neither entirely accurate nor ultimately 
helpful. For example, President Bush did not have unanimous support 
from conservative legislators for restructuring Head Start. 1 40 In contrast, 
the Senate committee voted unanimously across party lines in support of 
its bill in November 2 003 . 14 1  Moreover, Head Start has long enjoyed 
wide bipartisan support from presidents and legislators alike. 1 42 
Proposals to restructure Head Start have always come fr om both parties, 
from Republican President Nixon's attempt to block grant Head Start to 
Democratic President Carter's attempt to move it to the ED. Moving 
beyond Head Start to other controversies around federal as opposed to 
state control, it was the first President Bush, a Republican, who signed 
into law the Child Care and Development Block Grant of 1 990, the first 
major federal initiative for child care since the failed Comprehensive 
Child Development Act of 1 97 1-a law that firmly linked the federal 
government to supporting early care and education.143 It was Democratic 
President Clinton who signed into law one of the most controversial 
block grant moves of the last two decades-the end of the federal 
welfare entitlement program in favor of time-limited block grants to the 
states. 144 And while the current President Bush's NCLB is structured as 
a block grant, it represents a major increase in federal involvement in 
education, something quite different from what, for example, President 
Reagan would have thought appropriate.1 45 NCLB itself crosses party 
lines both in support and disdain; it was passed with the strong support of 
congressional Democrats, and yet now faces strong criticism for its 
alleged underfunding and overly stringent requirements from state 
governors and legislators of both parties. 146 
Finally, the idea that the federal government support is linked firmly 
and inextricably to progressive policies while state support is linked to 
conservative policies m ay be rooted more in historical happenstance-it 
140. NHSA, Legislative A lert, supra note 73. 
1 4 l . See Swindell, supra note 84. 
142. See, e.g., Sarah Glazer, Head Start: Does the much-touted program really 
deliver? CQ RESEARCHER, Apr. 9, 1 993, at 1 .  See also ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 
7, at 1 2 1 -22, 2 1 0- 1 l .  
1 43.  See CONLAN, supra note 34, at 222-23 . 
1 44. See id. at 290-9 1 .  
145.  Contrast, for example, the detailed requirements of NCLB, to which the ED has 
devoted an entire website, www.ed.gov/nclb, with President Reagan's stated desire to 
disestablish that Department. See STALLINGS, supra note 1 1 9, at 4. 
146. See, e.g., Ronnie Lynn, 'No Child ' rebellion picking up momentum, THE SALT 
LAKE TRlBUNE, Feb. 5, 2004, at A I ;  Eric Kelderman, State republica ns assail Bush 
education law, STATELINE.ORG, Jan. 28, 2004, available at http://www.stateline.org/ 
liveNiewPage.action?siteNodeld= I 36&languageld= I &contentId= 1 5546; Betsy 
Hammond, Oregon considers challenging No Child Left Behind law, THE OREGONIAN, 
Nov. 26, 2003, at A I .  
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was FDR's federal New Deal that overcame the Depression, while the 
argument for states' rights has sometimes been linked to white 
supremacy-than anything required by the structure of federalism itself. 
If the federal government provides a floor beneath which states may not 
descend, there is no reason to assume that states will always provide 
fewer resources than the federal government would. 
Reducing the disputes over the structure of Head Start to party-line 
politics therefore ultimately obscures real policy questions and makes 
unbiased reconsideration of program structure difficult. It is important to 
recognize the long, contentious history of these disputes. But it is also 
important to consider whether substantive arguments from 1965 or 1975 
still hold sway. The Head Start advocates seem to have won their current 
battles against structural refonn, but will the victory be anything but 
pyrrhic? Further, how does this decades-long history affect political 
relationships crucial to improving the program in ways the advocates 
want? The next two sections attempt to answer these questions, first by 
exploring policy and doctrinal changes that have reshaped the field in the 
decades since Head Start was created, and next by exploring procedural 
barriers to policy change. 
II. Policy Changes and Doctrinal Developments Relevant to Head 
Start, 1965 to the Present 
A.  Policy Changes 
1 .  Early Childhood Education and Care 
When Head Start was created in 1965, preschool and formal child 
care programs for children five years old and under were rare. Labor 
force participation of women with children was low; in 1960, only one­
fifth of mothers with children under the age of six worked outside the 
home. 147 Additionally, matching the one-worker, two-parent family 
structure that was then typical, the government expected mothers 
receiving welfare to stay at home caring for their children; welfare 
reform was only just beginning to connect welfare recipients to work 
outside the home. 148 Child development research was just starting to 
focus on the important role that environmental factors in the first few 
147. Sheila B. Kamerman & Shirley Gatenio, Overview of the Current Policy 
Context, in EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATION & CARE IN THE USA 7 (Debby Cryer & 
Richard M. Clifford, eds., 2003). See also WILLIAM T. GORMLEY, JR., EVERYBODY'S 
CHILDREN: CHILD CARE AS A PUBLIC PROBLEM 1 6- 1 9  (Brookings Inst. 1 995). 
1 48. ALFRED J. KAHN & SHEILA B.  KAMERMAN, CHILD CARE: FACING THE HARD 
CHOICES 122-25 (Auburn House 1987). 
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years of a child's life would play in that child' s  future academic and 
social development. 1 49 What few preschool programs there were 
generally served as enrichment programs for the middle class. I SO 
Previous federal attention to child care issues had arisen only in the 
context of wartime, as federally-sponsored day care centers allowed 
women to work outside the home when the male labor force was off in 
hattIe; the last federal initiatiye for child care, the Lanham Act, had 
expired at the end of World War II. l S I States had never developed any 
formal child care programs, although states had eventually assimilated 
kindergartens, which had started as private charity-based organizations, 
into the public schools. 1 52 In this context, Head Start stood out as an 
innovative program, unique in its field. 
Today, that field has changed. 153 By 1 996, over sixty percent of 
mothers with children under six worked outside the home, 154  making the 
need for formal child care common. The controversial 1 996 change in 
the welfare laws now requires that even women with infants work 
outside the home to receive benefits, again increasing the need for child 
care. I SS Single-parent families have also increased, and heads of these 
households are likely to work full time and need child care. 1 56 Private 
day care centers have exploded in number. 157 A 1 999 study reported that 
forty-six percent of three-year-olds and seventy percent of four-year-olds 
received some type of center-based care that year. 1 58 Infants and toddlers 
are also increasingly served by child care; in 1 995, fifty-four percent of 
two-year-olds, fifty percent of one-year-olds, and forty-five percent of 
children under one were served by some type of nonparental child care 
arrangement, primarily through nonrelative care outside the child's 
149. Zigler & Anderson, supra note 7, at 6- 1 1 .  
I SO. Kamennan & Gatenio, supra note 147, at 5. 
1 5 1 .  Id.; ABBIE GORDON KLEIN, THE DEBATE OVER CHILD CARE, 1 969- 1 990: A 
SOCIOHISTORICAL ANALYSIS 59-60 at n. 1 ( 1 992). 
1 52. See KLEIN, supra note 1 5 1 ,  at 26 1 -320 (discussing the history of controversies 
surrounding kindergarten and their parallel to contemporary controversies surrounding 
child care). 
153 .  See generally GERALDINE YOUCHA, MINDING THE CHILDREN: CHILD CARE IN 
AMERICA FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT ( 1 995), for more on the history of these 
developments; see also KLEIN, supra note 1 5 1 ;  JAMES L. HYMES, JR., EARLY CHILDHOOD 
EDUCATION: TWENTY YEARS IN REVIEW ( 1 99 1 ); KAHN & KAMERMAN, supra note 148. 
1 54. Kamennan & Gatenio, supra note 147, at 7-8. 
1 55. Id. at 8-9. See infra Section II.A.2 for more on the 1 996 welfare reauthorization. 
1 56 .  Kamennan & Gatenio, supra note 147, at  7-8. 
1 57. GORMLEY, supra note 147, at 44, 68 ( 1 995); KAHN & KAMERMAN, supra note 
1 48, at 1 08.  
1 58. Anne W. Mitchell, Education/or All Young Children: The Role o/States and the 
Federal Government in Promoting Prekindergarten and Kindergarten 4 (Found. for 
Child Dev. Working Paper Series 200 1 ). 
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home. 159 Child development research on the importance o f  the birth to 
five years has had a ripple effect through American society, leading to 
the growth of an entire industry to support young children 's early 
development . Child care and development are thus increasingly seen as 
a broad-based societal need and a common reality, not only of poor 
families but of all families, and developmentally appropriate activities 
--are expected of quality care} 60 
Over time, families have come to rely on both federal and state 
involvement in the provision or regulation of these services. At the 
federal level, a wide variety of programs exist, none of which were in 
place when Head Start was created. Most centrally, the Child Care and 
Development Fund (CCDF), overseen by the Child Care Bureau in 
HHS's Administration for Children and Families (ACF), provides states 
with a block grant to subsidize child care for parents whose income is 
less than eighty-five percent of the state's median income. 16 1  In fiscal 
year 2006, CCDF-inc1uding mandatory, matching, and discretionary 
funds-was funded at $4.9 billion. 162 ACF, along with state welfare 
agencies, also administers Temporary Assistance for Needy Family 
(T ANF), which is the block grant that replaced the federal provision of 
welfare and which is another major source of federal funding for child 
care. 1 63 Estimates for state child care expenditures through T ANF were 
at $2.2 billion in 200 1 . 164 The Social Services Block Grant is a smaller 
source of federal child care money that ACF administers, providing $165 
million for child care in 2000. 165 
Outside HHS, the Child and Adult Care Food Program, run by the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture's Food and Nutrition Service, provides 
funding for state agencies to subsidize meals and snacks in licensed child 
care programs, worth $ 1 .74 billion in fiscal year 200 1 . 166 Additionally, 
the ED administers grants to state education agencies to provide early 
intervention services for infants and toddlers with disabilities, over $400 
1 59. Kamennan & Gatenio, supra note 147, at 1 7, tbl. 1 .4. 
1 60. See, e.g., GORMLEY, supra note 1 47, at 25-32. 
1 6 1 .  Kamennan & Gatenio, supra note 1 47, at 1 8 .  See Julienne C .  Johnson, The Role 
of Government in Early Care and Education: Who Decides? in CONTINUING ISSUES IN 
EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATION 1 0- 1 1 ,  1 8-22 (Carol Seefeldt & Alice Galper, eds., 2d ed. 
1 998), for more on the history of CCDF. See also CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, A 
FRAGILE FOUNDATION: STATE CHILD CARE ASSISTANCE POLICIES viii-ix, 2-3 (200 1 ). 
1 62. Child Care Bureau, Fiscal Year 2006 Federal Child Care Appropriations, 
http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/ccb/policy l lmisc/approp02.htm (last visited Aug. 20, 
2006). 
1 63 .  W.S. Barnett & L. Masse, Funding Issues for Early Childhood Education and 
Care Programs, in EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATION, supra note 1 47, at 1 46-47. 
1 64. Id. at 1 47. 
1 65 .  Kamerman & Gatenio, supra note 147, at 2 1 .  
1 66. [d. 
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million in fiscal year 2006, and special education and related services for 
preschool-aged children with disabilities, over $381 million in fiscal year 
2006.1 67 The ED also supports preschool programs through its state 
funding for high-poverty school districts, amounting to approximately 
$200 million in 2002, and coordinates a variety of smaller competitive 
grant programs for preschool-aged children.168 Finally, the Child and 
Dependent Care Tax Credit, overseen by the Department of Treasury's 
Internal Revenue Service, allows a family's personal income tax to be 
reduced on a sliding scale by a certain percentage of eligible expenses 
towards child care. 169 In 2000, the tax credit was valued at 
approximately $3 billion and was used by more than six million 
families. 1 70 
Four structural points from this review of federal programs are 
relevant for our purposes. First, Head Start is no longer unique in 
providing federal resources for preschool-aged children and their 
families. It is true that Head Start is the only program that serves exactly 
the population that it does in exactly the way that it does, but this fact 
does not necessarily lead to the idea that its structure is the only possible 
way to achieve its aims. Second, all of the major programs that are not 
tax relief are funded as block grants to the states, whether through human 
service agencies or education agencies. The block grants contain clearly 
specified program requirements, with the federal government permitting 
the states to use federal funds only within strict guidelines.1 71 Any 
requirement that could be enforced by a federal-local structure could thus 
also be written into the structure of a block grant. Third, Indian tribes 
and U.S. territories are not left out of the block grant structure to the 
states, a fear that the NHSA voiced if Head Start were turned over to the 
1 67. Jd. at 2 1 -22; Barnett & Masse, supra note 1 63, at 1 49-50; Child Care Bureau, 
Fiscal Year 2006 Federal Child Care Appropriations, supra note 1 62 .  
1 68. Child Care Bureau, Fiscal Year 2006 Federal Child Care Appropriations, supra 
note 1 62; see also Danielle Ewen, Jennifer Mezey, & Hannah Matthews, Ctr. for Law & 
Social Policy, Missed Opportunities? The Possibilities and Challenges of Funding High­
Quality Preschool through Title J of the No Child Left Behind Act (Mar. 2005). 
1 69. Kamerrnan & Gatenio, supra note 1 47, at 20; Johnson, supra note 1 6 1 ,  at 1 0. 
1 70. Kamerrnan & Gatenio, supra note 1 47, at 20. Another tax relief program that 
supports private spending on child care is the Dependent Care Assistance Program, which 
allows eligible taxpayers to deduct a certain amount of their child care expenses from 
their taxable income. Employers must elect to provide this type of account to their 
employees. See Barnett & Masse, supra note 1 63,  at 1 48; NAT'L WOMEN'S LAW CTR., 
CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE: USING TAX BREAKS TO HELP PAY FOR CHILD AND 
DEPENDENT CARE 5 (2002). 
1 7 1 .  The Child Care block grant, in particular, is detailed in its requirements. See 
GORMLEY, supra note 1 47, at 1 22-2 3 .  It is true, however, that federal policy has been to 
allow the states a wide degree of flexibility in setting program aims. See Kamerrnan & 
Gatenio, supra note 1 47, at 24. 
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states. l 72 For example, the Child Care and Development Fund provides 
money directly to tribes. 1 73 Finally, the ED is already involved with 
federal child care moneys. Although HHS ' s  Child Care Bureau clearly 
plays a larger role, the alleged great divide between ED and HHS may 
not be so great. 
The states themselves have devoted growing amounts o f  funds to 
early care and education services since Head Start was founded, and 
especially since the passage of the 1990 federal Child Care and 
Development Block Grant. 1 74 All fifty states now offer some form of 
kindergarten, generally serving five- and six-year-olds, and attendance is 
increasingly mandatory. 1 75 Since 1991, states have almost tripled their 
financial funding for prekindergarten programs, reaching almost $ 1 .9 
billion in 2000, and forty-two states now run some type of 
prekindergarten program. 1 76 Since federal child care money requires that 
states use it to "supplement, not supplant" already available state 
dollars, 1 77 the overall amount of money for child care has increased over 
the period that these federal funds have been offered. 178 Further, more 
federal money becomes available as states increase the use of state funds, 
and although not all states can budget enough child care dollars to obtain 
the federal maximum, some do. 179 Interestingly, seventeen states use 
their own funds to expand Head Start programs; three other states use the 
federal Head Start program standards in their own non-Head Start 
programs. 1 80 While none of these state services are available to every 
eligible child-whether funded at the federal or state level, all early care 
and education, including Head Start, is underfunded, and threatened in 
times of cutting budgetsl 8 1-the growth in state provision of services, 
1 72. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
1 73.  See, e.g., Child Care Bureau, Reporting Requirements for Child Care and 
Development Fund (CCDF) Grantees, hrtp ://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ccb/ 
reportlindex.htm (last visited Aug. 20, 2006) (listing resources and requirements for tribal 
grantees). 
1 74. See Kamerman & Gatenio, supra note 147, at 22-24; Barnett & Masse, supra 
note 1 63, at 1 5 1 -53;  CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, A FRAGILE FOUNDATION, supra note 
1 6 1 ;  CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, STATE DEVELOPMENTS IN CHILD CARE, EARLY 
EDUCATION, AND SCHOOL-AGE CARE 200 1 ;  Mitchell, supra note 1 58, for more on the 
development of state attention to early care and education. 
1 75. EDUCATION COMMISSION OF THE STATES, STATE NOTES KINDERGARTEN: STATE 
STATUTES REGARDING KINDERGARTEN (Aug. 2003). 
1 76. Kamerman & Gatenio, supra note 1 47, at 23. 
1 77. Child Care Bureau, Fiscal Year 2006 Federal Child Care Appropriations, supra 
note 1 62 .  
1 78. Kamerman & Gatenio, supra note 1 47, at 24. 
1 79. Johnson, supra note 1 6 1 ,  at 1 2. 
1 80 .  Mitchell, supra note 1 58, at 1 5, App. 1 2-5. 
1 8 1 .  CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, Low-INCOME FAMILIES BEAR THE BURDEN O F  STATE 
CHILD CARE CUTBACKS (2002); CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, A FRAGILE FOUNDATION, 
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vouchers or subsidies to parents, and reimbursement to child care 
providers has significantly changed the shape of the field in the last 
decade. 
Federal Head Start policy has grown to accommodate the explosion 
of the field of early childhood education and care. Since 1 990, the 
federal Head Start Bureau has funded Head Start-State Collaboration 
Offices to promote coordination of state programs that serve this age 
groUp.1 82 The collaboration office in each state is located in a different 
office, including a special state executive branch office for children, a 
state department of education, a state department of social services, and a 
governor's office. 1 83 The existence of these collaboration offices cuts 
both ways in the argument over whether federal-local or state control is 
better. On the one hand, the fact that the offices exist might suggest that 
states need greater control over funding and policy to better coordinate 
their efforts, while on the other hand, the fact that the offices exist might 
suggest that no more state control or coordination than what is already in 
place is needed. Either way, though, the rhetoric about the states being 
unable to run effective programs for needy children is belied. Further, 
that the collaboration offices are located in so many different 
administrative agencies also cuts both ways in the argument over 
whether HHS or ED must run Head Start: on the one hand, it might 
suggest that the particular agency that governs these services is less 
important than the services that are being coordinated and provided, 
while on the other hand, it might suggest that the state agency is 
unimportant only if the federal agency is providing oversight to the 
issues in a way that only HHS can. Either way, the different types of 
state agencies underscore the high extent to which the issues that concern 
Head Start are strongly embedded throughout state policy. 
Beyond the existing programs at the federal and state level, a vast 
network of think-tanks, university research programs, and advocacy 
organizations have spearheaded a national debate about the potentials for 
a full:::scale provision of early education and care. 1 84 Many researchers 
and advocates have developed proposals for providing quality early 
supra note 1 6 1 ,  at viii. 
1 82. See Head Start Bureau, The Head Start-State Collaboration Offices (2006), 
http://www .acf.hhs.gov/programs/hsb/contacts/statecollab l .htrn (last visited Aug. 20, 
2006). 
1 83. See Head Start Bureau, Head Start-State Collaboration Offices (2003), 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/hsb/eontaets/stateeollab.htm (last visited Aug. 20, 
2006). 
1 84. See The Nat' l  Ctr. for Children in Poverty (Columbia Univ. Mailman School of 
Public Health), available at http://www.neep.org!; The Children's  Defense Fund, 
available at http://www .childrensdefense.org/; The Nat' l  Child Care Info. Ctr., available 
at www.necic.org, for a sampling of different types of organizations. 
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education and care to every child in the country, noting that the current 
approach is too fragmented. 1 8S Some of these proposals advocate linking 
Head Start with other programs for a seamless delivery system. 1 86 No 
one suggests that the current patchwork of programs provides enough 
quality education and care to enough children and families. In part, the 
problem is related to underfunding; despite the array of federal and state 
programs designed to provide financial support for child care, families 
still pay around seventy percent of the country' s  total child care 
expenses, 1 87 which for low-income families can be twenty-five percent or 
more of their budgets, 1 88 and which also is a high fixed cost even for 
middle class families. 1 89 Even Head Start, which is free for those 
enrolled, is funded at a level that reaches only around one-third of all 
children who are otherwise eligible for it. 1 90 In part, the problem is 
related to quality; Head Start remains one of the few widespread 
programs with strict standards for quality and accountability, and many 
programs are not as well crafted. 19 1  Still, the explosion of attention to the 
field completely changes the context in which Head Start finds itself, 
making a reexamination of its structure appropriate. 
2. Health, Welfare, and Work 
An important aspect of Head Start is the program's role in providing 
health services for the children under its care. 192 This health component 
of Head Start is one that advocates fear will disappear if the program 
1 85.  See, e.g., Kamerman & Gatenio, supra note 147, at 6; GORMLEY, supra note 1 47, 
at 1 66-9 1 ;  DAVID M. BLAU, THE CHILD CARE PROBLEM: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 2 1 6-
2 3 1  (200 1 ); Gwen Morgan, A Head Start for All Children, in THE HEAD START DEBATES, 
supra note 37, at 363-77. 
1 86. See, e.g., MATTA FINN-STEVENSON & EDWARD ZIGLER, SCHOOLS OF THE 2 1 ST 
CENTURY: LINKING CHILD CARE AND EDUCATION 1 1 3- 1 6  ( 1 999). That Edward Zigler, a 
former member of the planning committee for Head Start and an early administrator of 
the federal Head Start office, advocates such linkages is  noteworthy. 
1 87. Kamerman & Gatenio, supra note 147, at 1 8. See also CHILDREN'S DEFENSE 
FUND, A FRAGILE FOUNDATION, supra note 1 6 1 ,  at ix-x. 
1 88 .  SUZANNE W. HELBURN & BARBARA R. BERGMANN, AMERICA'S CHILD CARE 
PROBLEM: THE WAY OUT 2 (2002). 
1 89. /d. at 4; see also GORMLEY, supra note 147, at 25.  
1 90. See Johnson, supra note 1 6 1 ,  at 9. 
1 9 1 . See HELBURN & BERGMANN, supra note 1 88, at 5 5-85 . 
192.  See A. Frederick North, Jr., Health Services in Head Start, in PROJECT HEAD 
START, supra note 7, at 23 1 ;  Donald J. Cohen, Albert J. Soinit, & Paul Wohlford, Mental 
Health Services in Head Start, in PROJECT HEAD START, supra note 7, at 259, for more on 
Head Start's historical connection to health services. See Robert W. O'Brien, David B. 
Connell, & James Griffin, Head Start 's Efforts to Improve Child Health, in THE HEAD 
START DEBATES, supra note 37, at 1 6 1 -78; Jane Knitzer, The Challenge of Men tal Health 
in Head Start: Making the Vision Real, in THE HEAD START DEBATES, supra note 3 7, at 
1 79-92, for more on Head Start's contemporary connection to health services. 
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shifts either to the states or to the ED. 1 93 While no one could look at the 
system of health care in the United States and be satisfied with its equity, 
availability, or cost, it is nonetheless true that the field of health care for 
poor children has changed dramatically since Head Start began. 
Created in 1 965, the same year as Head Start, Medicaid is the maj or 
program that pays for health care for poor children. 194 Medicaid is 
jointly funded by the federal governrnent and the states. 195 The primary 
Medicaid program that reaches poor children is the Early and Periodic 
Screening, Diagnostic, and Treatment (EPSDT) service, a program with 
which Head Start has long partnered. 1 96 Through EPSDT, covered 
children receive such benefits as physical exams, immunizations, 
laboratory tests, health education, and vision, dental, and hearing 
services. 1 97 States set the exact parameters of eligibility for this 
program. 198 
The State Children' s  Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), a more 
recent program, was created in 1997 to cover children in low-income 
families whose income exceeds the Medicaid cutoff but who still cannot 
buy private health insurance on their own. 199 Another federal-state 
partnership, SCHIP is designed the way one version of the Head Start 
block grant proposal might work; there are certain federal minimum 
requirements that individual state plans must meet, but states have a wide 
variety of ways of designing their plans.20o Nothing about these 
programs requires linkage with Head Start as it is currently structured. 
While budget cuts at the state level are a source of strong concern to 
many advocates,201 budgets at the federal level are not immune to cuts. 
1 93. NHSA, Legislative Alert, supra note 73 . 
1 94. See ELICIA J. HERZ, CONGo RESEARCH SERV., MEDICAID: A PRIMER CRS-2 to 5 
(2005), available at http://opencrs.cdt.org/rptsIRL3 3 202_2005 1 222. pdf. 
1 95. See 42 U.S.c. § 1 396a(a)(2) (2006). 
1 96. See 42 U.S.c. § 1 396a(a)(43) (2006); see also PROJECT HEAD START, supra note 
7, at 149. 
1 97. See 42 U. S.c. § 1 396a(a)(43) (2006). 
1 98. See generally 42 U.S.c. § 1 396(a) (2006). 
1 99. See Lisa Dubay, Genevieve Kenney, & Jennifer Haley, Children 's Participation 
in Medicaid and SCHIP: Early in the SCHIP Era, NEW FEDERALISM NATIONAL SURVEY 
OF AMERICA'S FAMILIES, Series B ,  No. B-40 (Urban lost. Mar. 2002); 42 U.S.c. 
§ 1 397aa(a) (2006) (describing purpose of program) . 
200. See 42 U.S.C. § 1 397bb (2006) (describing general requirements for state child 
health plans under this program). 
20 I .  See, e.g., Leighton Ku & Sashi Nimalendran, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY 
PRIORITIES, LOSlNG OUT: STATES ARE CUTTING 1 .2 TO 1 .6 MILLION Low-INCOME PEOPLE 
FROM MEDICAID, SCHIP AND OTHER STATE HEALTH INSURANCE PROGRAMS (2003), 
available at http://www.cbpp.org/ 1 2-22-03health.htm; Donna Cohen Ross & Laura Cox, 
CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, OUT rN THE COLD: ENROLLMENT FREEZES IN SIX 
STATE CHILDREN'S HEALTH INSURANCE PROGRAMS WITHHOLD COVERAGE FROM ELIGIBLE 
CHILDREN (2004), available at http://www .cbpp.orgl I 2-22-03health2.htm; Margo 
Edmunds, Martha Teitelbaum, & Cassy Gleason, CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, ALL OVER 
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The real issue is coalition building to ensure full funding, not whether the 
program is funded at the state or federal level. 
It would be hard to discuss the funding structure of major social 
service programs without mentioning the 1996 battles over welfare 
refonn, in which welfare was converted from a federal entitlement 
program into a block grant to the states.202 The population of families 
receiving welfare overlaps with the population of families served by 
Head Start,203 so poor families and their advocates have a vested stake in 
both programs. Indeed, many of the opponents to block granting Head 
Start were also opponents of the 1 996 welfare refonn.204 The 1996 
legislation imposed time limits of a maximum five years in a recipient's 
lifetime,205 as well as new and heavier work requirements.206 The 
legislation also contained maj or budget cutS.207 While any in-depth 
analysis of this policy change lies far beyond the scope of this article, it 
is worth emphasizing that the most controversial elements of the 
refonn- the imposition of time limits and the decrease in federal 
funding--could have been achieved through the regular process of 
reauthorization and appropriation without transforming welfare into 
block grants. These changes happened to accompany the devolution of 
welfare to a block grant, but they were neither necessary elements of a 
block grant nor impossible to achieve through a federal program. 
As a final note on changes in welfare and work policies since 1 965, 
it is important to mention the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC).208 First 
begun in 1975 and sharply expanded in the 1 990s, the EITC provides a 
wage supplement directly to low-income workers to increase their 
incentive to move off welfare and into work.209 Currently, the EITC is 
one of the three largest federal programs to support poor families and is 
worth $30 billion annually/ tO which is more than all federal money spent 
THE MAP: A PROGRESS REpORT ON THE STATE CHILDREN'S HEALTH INSURANCE PROGRAM 
(CHIP) (2000). 
202. A vast literature on this topic exists. See MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF 
THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WELFARE IN AMERlCA 300-34 ( 1 996); CONLAN, 
supra note 34, at 272-92; PETER EDELMAN, SEARCHING FOR AMERlCA'S HEART: RFK AND 
THE RENEWAL OF HOPE 1 1 9-43 (200 1 ), for three different discussions ranging from the 
academic to the personal. 
203. See, e.g., KAHN & KAMERMAN, supra note 1 48, at 1 35.  
204. See KATZ, supra note 202, at 330. 
205. Sheila R. Zedlewski & Jennifer Holland, How MUCH Do WELFARE RECtPIENTS 
KNow ABOUT TIME LIMITS? (Urban Inst. 2003), available at http://www.urban.org/ 
uploadedpdf/3 1 0904_snapshots3 _no 1 5 . pdf. 
206. KATZ, supra note 202, at 33 1 ;  CONLAN, supra note 34, at 289. 
207. KATZ, supra note 202, at 33 1 ;  CONLAN, supra note 34, at 290. 
208. See REBECCA M. BLANK, IT TAKES A NATION: A NEW AGENDA FOR FIGHTING 
POVERTY 1 1 1 - 14 ( 1 997). 
209. See id. at 1 1 2- 1 3 . 
2 1 0. Leonard E. Bunnan & Deborah I. Kobes, Tax Facts: EITC Reaches More 
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on Head Start and child care combined.21 1 Recent studies demonstrate 
that the EITC is the most successful of all income support programs at 
reaching low-income families with children.21 2 Some scholars explicitly 
refer to the EITC as "a form of child care support,,,21 3 and suggest that 
expanding the EITC might be a good way to get more money into the 
child care system rather than directly funding child care either as a block 
grant or a federal program.214 The EITC thus represents another major 
change in the structure of welfare and work that affects the broad policy 
context in which today's Head Start finds itself. 
3 .  The Education System and Traditionally Under-Served 
Populations 
Advocates for Head Start object to transferring federal oversight of 
the program to the ED for two primary reasons: first, the school system 
has historically not met the needs of poor, minority children, and second, 
the school system does not provide the type of comprehensive services, 
from health care to parent involvement, that are the hallmark of Head 
Start.2 l S  Changes on both of these fronts require rethinking. 
The realities of racial segregation in the school system (and beyond) 
in 1 965 when Head Start was created are stark and disturbing to recall. 
Head Start's originators were understandably reluctant to root massive 
amounts of federal money through states where governors vociferously 
defied federal desegregation orders216 or through public school systems 
that would rather close than admit black children.217 Yet while the 
contemporary system of public education in the United States is far from 
perfect, it is clear that the current system in no way parallels the reality 
Eligible Families Than TANF. Food Stamps (Tax Policy Ctr., Urban lnst. & Brookings 
Inst., Mar. 1 7 ,  2003), available at http://www.urban.orgluploadedpdf/ 
1 000467 _EITC_reaches.pdf. 
2 1 1 .  Calculated by adding appropriations for Head Start (see Head Start Program Fact 
Sheet, supra note 1 5 )  and child care programs (see Child Care Bureau, Fiscal Year 2006 
Federal Child Care Appropriations, supra note 1 62). 
2 1 2.  Burman & Kobes, supra note 2 1 0. 
2 1 3 . GORMLEY, SUpra note 1 47, at 47. 
2 1 4. BLAU, supra note 1 85,  at 67, 2 1 3. 
2 1 5. See supra notes 73-79, 1 28- 1 3 1  and accompanying text. 
2 1 6. See generally UNDERSTANDING THE LITILE ROCK CRISIS: AN EXERCISE IN 
REMEMBRANCE AND RECONCILIATION (Elizabeth Jacoway, C. Fred Williams, eds., 1 999) 
(opposition of Arkansas governor to desegregation); see also RAFFEL, supra note 1 0, at 
34 (Virginia), 1 58 (Alabama). 
2 1 7. See, e.g., RAFFEL, supra note 1 0, at 1 58 ( 1 998) (detailing Virginia legislative 
sessions devoted to figuring out ways to stop integration, including shutting down school 
systems and providing money for white children to attend private schools); ZIGLER & 
MUENCHOW, supra note 7, at 1 82 (describing refusal of Lee County, Alabama to sell an 
empty public school building to a Head Start program so that the building could be sold 
to a white-only private school). 
. 
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of 1 965. Decades of reforms within the educational establishment have 
focused, albeit with varying degrees of success, on rooting out economic 
and racial inequities. From the high school completion rate2 1 8  to 
enrollment in college preparatory classes2 1 9  to college attendance/2o 
there is evidence of the improved status of minority students. To be sure, 
the American school system remains plagued by inequality; recent 
studies report that schools are now re-segregating (although not by 
government fiat),22I  and minority students are overrepresented in the 
country's special education population222 and lower tracks of ability­
grouped systems.223 Scholars, activists, and policy-makers rightly focus 
on these problems of inequity. Yet the focus on what the system still 
needs to achieve should not ignore the progress that has been made over 
the last few decades.  
Further, to say today that Head Start must remain separate from the 
school system is ultimately to condemn the school system. This is 
certainly not an implausible argument, but it is  worth examining the full 
implications of such an argument, were Head Start advocates to make it 
more explicitly. Taking the argument to one ultimate conclusion would 
be to say that it is actually appropriate that schools re-segregate so that 
attention can be devoted to each sector of the popUlation; in fact, the 
federal government should open and fund schools for minority children, 
and/or poor children, of every age level, since the state and local systems 
2 1 8. See, e.g., EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY PROJECT SERIES, VOLUME I: A 
REpORT OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS 73 (Dec. 1 996) (indicating 
that high school completion rates for 1 8  to 24-year-olds increased by ten percentage 
points for black students from 1 973 to 1 9 94, from 66.8% to 77.0%, while rate for white 
students remained effectively constant at approximately 83.0%; however, completion rate 
for Hispanics remained essentialIy fixed around 55% over that twenty-year period). 
2 1 9. See id. at 1 29 (indicating that, over ten-year period in the 1 980s, percentage of 
blacks in sophomore year of high school enrolled in college preparatory classes increased 
from 26.9% to 40.9%, roughly equivalent with white enrollment at 42%, while 
enrollment of Hispanic students increased 24.6% to 3 5 . 1  %; during same period, 
vocational enrollment declined for blacks from 34. 1 % to 6.2%, for Hispanics from 29.2% 
to 9.9%, and for whites from 1 7.6% to 6.3%). 
220. See William G. Bowen, Derek Bok, The Shape of the River: Long-Term 
Consequences of Considering Race in College and University Admissions 9- 1 0  ( 1 998) 
(noting that percentage of black students aged 25 to 29 with college degrees rose from 
5 .4% to 1 5.4% between 1 960 and 1 995,  while percentage of Hispanics older than 25 with 
a college degree rose from 4.5% in 1 970 to 9.2% in 1 995). 
22 1 .  See generally GARY ORFIELD & JOHN T. YUN, RESEGREGATION IN AMERICAN 
SCHOOLS (The Civil Rights Project, Harvard Univ., 1 999); GARY ORFIELD, SUSAN E. 
EATON, & THE HARVARD PROJECT ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION, DISMANTLING 
DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION ( 1 996). 
222. See, e.g., HERBERT GROSSMAN, ENDING DISCRIMINATION IN SPECIAL EDUCATION 
(2d. ed. 2002). 
223. See, e.g., TOM LOVELESS, THE TRACKING WARS: STATE REFORM MEETS SCHOOL 
POLICY 2-3, 14 (1 999). 
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still seem to be failing them. Alternatively, to take the argument in a 
different direction, rejecting the public school system for private school 
vouchers is the appropriate solution. The voucher movement is closely 
connected to this idea of the failure of the public school system, 
especially for poor and minority students, and vouchers are indeed 
popular among many low-income and African American cornmunities.224 
It is not inconceivable that Head Start advocates intend to make either of 
these arguments, but this potential interest in radical federal 
reconfiguration on the one hand or entirely abandoning a failing school 
system on the other remains, at most, unspoken.225 
It is also important to note that about one-third of Head Start's 
population are white children?26 Thus, the issue is the ability of the 
public schools to serve not only poor minority children but poor children, 
period. But in this area, too, the education system has made great strides 
over the last forty years. The 1965 Elementary and Secondary Education 
Act, passed the same year as Head Start, created Title I, a dedicated 
funding stream targeted to serve poor children and high-poverty 
schools.227 States have also increasingly directed their own funds to such 
students.228 After the Supreme Court held that there was no federal 
constitutional right to education and, therefore, no requirement to 
equalize funding between poor and wealthy school districts,229 advocates 
224. See, e.g., RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, ALL TOGETHER Now: CREATING MlDDLE­
CLASS SCHOOLS THROUGH PuBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE 1 2 1 -22 (200 1 ). 
225. Since resegregation of public schools i s  an issue of concern when considering 
the ability of the public school system to serve minority children, it is worth noting that 
Head Start programs, located as they often are in residentially segregated communities, 
are often just as racially segregated as the public schools. The historical role of 
socioeconomic integration in Head Start programs is additionally interesting to consider 
in light of this reality. One charge frequently levied against the school system is that 
socioeconomic segregation limits its ultimate success. See generally, KAHLENBERG, 
supra note 224. But Head Start has from its conception been conceived of as a purposely 
socioeconomically segregated program. There were some early attempts to integrate 
some percentage of paying middle class children on a sliding scale, but federal policy 
shifted away from this. See ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 7, at 1 26-3 1 .  Advocates 
in fact insisted that Head Start remain l imited to poor children, another controversy that 
helped doom the 1 97 1  Child Development Act to failure. Id. Contrasting de/acto racial 
segregation and de jure economic segregation in Head Start programs with Head Start 
advocates' dismay at such segregation in the public school system, it becomes apparent 
that the Head Start community has an ambivalent relationship towards different types of 
segregation. 
226. Head Start Bureau, Head Start Program Fact Sheet, supra note 1 5 .  
227. See, e.g., John F. Jennings, Title I: Its Legislative History and Its Promise, in 
TITLE I: COMPENSATORY EDUCATION AT THE CROSSROADS 1 -24 (Geoffrey D. Borman, 
Samuel C. Stringfield, & Robert E. Slavin, eds., 2 00 1 ). 
228. Kevin Carey, eTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, STATE POVERTy-BASED 
EDUCATION FUNDING: A SURVEY OF CURRENT PROGRAMS AND OPTIONS FOR 
IMPROVEMENT (2002), available at http://www.cbpp.orgll l -7-02sfp.pdf. 
229. See San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 41 1 U.S. I ( 1 973). 
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for school equity turned to state-level litigation, which has resulted in 
completely revised funding systems in many states (although, again, 
inequities remain).230 Finally, NeLB comes (at least in rhetoric) as close 
to mandating equal education in the public schools as anything ever has, 
requiring, among other things, that districts provide demographic 
analysis of student test scores so that averages will not hide the lower 
performance of (and lack of attention paid to) traditionally under-served 
groups.23 J While hardly perfect, the school system has devoted 
considerable effort and has made significant improvement in its ability to 
serve poor children. 
As for the argument that the school system is unable to offer the 
family and comprehensive services that Head Start programs prize, this, 
too, is belied by on-the-ground changes since Head Start was created. 
Health and social services have become increasingly entrenched in the 
public schools.232 In particular, special education programs funded 
through the ED include a provision for "related services," through which 
special education students are entitled to various health services that will 
support their educational needs, and also include mandates for parent 
involvement.233 In implementing the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act (IDEA)-whose predecessor, the Education for All 
Handicapped Children Act, postdates Head Start by a decade234-the ED 
230. See, e.g., Paul Minorini & Stephen D. Sugannan, School Finance Litigation in 
the Name of Educational Equity: Its Evolution, Impact, and Future, in EQUITY AND 
ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION FINANCE 34-7 1 (Helen F. Ladd, Rosemary Chalk, & Janet. S .  
Hansen, eds., 1 999). 
23 1 .  See, e.g. , OFFICE OF THE UNDER SEC'y, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., No CHILD LEFT 
BEHIND: A DESKTOP REFERENCE 9, 1 4, 1 8, 23 (2002), http://www.ed.gov/admins/ 
leadlaccountlnclbreference/reference. pdf. 
232. See, e.g. , David Tyack, Health and Social Services in Public Schools: Historical 
Perspectives, 2 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 1 9  ( 1 992), reprinted in MARK G .  YUDOF, 
DAVID L. KIRP, BETSY LEVIN, & RACHEL F. MORAN, EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW 
758, 761  (Dan Alpert, Tangelique Williams & Stephanie Keough-Hedges eds., 
Wadsworth Group 4th ed. 2002) (noting sharp increase in percentage of non-instructional 
support staff providing social and health services and sharp decline in percentage of 
teachers when compared to all school employees in the period between 1 950 and 1 986). 
233. See 20 U.S.C. § 140 1 (22) (2006) (defining related services); 20 U .S.c. 
§ 1 4 1 4(d)( l )(B) (2006) (including parents as part of the team that crafts each child's 
Individualized Education Program). 
234. See UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, EQUAL EDUC. OPPORTUNITY AND 
NONDISCRIMINATION FOR STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES: FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT OF 
SECTION 504 3 1 -40 ( 1 996), http://eric.ed.govIERICDocs/data/ericdocs2/ 
contencstorage_O l /0000000b/80/2411 e/99.pdf.,  for more on the legislative history of 
these acts. Note that the special education laws started as a federal program when the 
states were seen as not doing enough for children with disabilities, but that this federal 
block grant has leveraged great sums of state and local money to serve these children. 
See Barnett & Masse, supra note 1 63 ,  at 1 6 1 ;  see also PAUL T. HILL & ELLEN L. MARKS, 
FEDERAL INFLUENCE OVER STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT: THE CASE OF 
NONDISCRIMINATION IN EDUCATION ( 1 982). 
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has already demonstrated that it can go beyond a narrow classroom focus 
to the human services that support those classrooms. Additionally, many 
school reformers call for a more wide-scale integration of education and 
human services, and point to many successful models around the 
country.235 Title I has also increasingly required schools to involve 
parents in their children's education.236 While Head Start advocates are 
correct that Head Start mandates and provides family and comprehensive 
services in a way that every individual school and school system does 
not, it is an exaggeration to say that such provision is either impossible or 
could not be done well. 
Even assuming that Head Start serves poor and minority children 
and provides comprehensive services better and more thoroughly than 
the school system currently does, there remains the argument that under 
the helm of the ED, Head Start could serve as a model in all of these 
areas. In the heat of opposition to proposals for structural change, Head 
Start advocates have long dismissed this idea, finding laughable the idea 
that tiny Head Start could provoke broader programmatic change, as 
opposed to being sw�llowed and co-opted by the larger department.237 
At other times, however, distant from such controversies, some 
advocates and early Head Start leaders have expressed the point of view 
that Head Start has served as a role model or instigated change in the 
school system by its very presence. For example, Julius Richmond, the 
first director of Head Start, has asserted that Head Start's low teacher­
pupil ratio created pressure on elementary schools in low-income 
neighborhoods to adopt similarly low ratios.238 Edward Zigler has stated 
that Head Start's inclusion of children with disabilities in its program 
influenced the special education legislation that followed a decade later, 
especially in its mandate of comprehensive services for children age 
three to five?39 If federal legislation shifting Head Start into the ED 
retained a focus on comprehensive services, or required that school 
systems in general provide those services, such requirements are likely to 
be met. The real issue is how the specific legislation governing Head 
235.  See, e.g., J. Levy & W. Shepardson, A Look at Current School-linked Service 
Efforts, in 2 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 44 (Spring 1 992), reprinted in EDUCATIONAL 
POLICY, supra note 232; FINN-STEVENSON & ZIGLER, supra note 1 86; Donna Cohen Ross 
& Meg Booth, Ctr. on Budget and Policy Priorities, Health Coverage Programs: Schools 
are Part of the Equation (200 I ), available at http://www.centeronbudget.orgl l 0- 1 -
0 1  health2.pdf. 
236. See Jerome V. D'  Agostino, Larry V. Hedges, Kenneth K. Wong, & Geoffrey D. 
Borman, Title I Parent Involvement Programs: Effects on Parenting Practices and 
Student Achievement, in TITLE I: COMPENSATORY EDUCATION, supra note 227, at 1 1 7-36. 
237. See HEAD START IN THE 1 980's, supra note 1 2 1 ;  NHSA, Legislative Alert, supra 
note 73.  
238. PROJECT HEAD START, supra note 7,  at  1 24 .  
239. ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 7 ,  at 1 64. 
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Start would be crafted, not which federal agency has oversight authority. 
One relative-and, in this context, ironic--constant in the 
educational system since Head Start's creation has been a strong 
connection between Head Start and local school systems. In the first 
summer, eighty percent of agencies that sponsored Head Start programs 
were schools, and in the 1 990s, despite the rhetoric of mistrust, nearly a 
third were.240 Zigler writes that "collaborative efforts between Head 
Start and the schools are on the rise," noting that, "[w]ith more minorities 
in leadership positions in the schools, Head Start may have less to fear 
from school sponsorship today than it did a decade ago.,,24 1 While Zigler 
concludes that Head Start is better able to collaborate effectively with 
school systems only if it remains outside the. educational 
establishment/42 it is simply no longer clear that this is the best way 
forward, given the changes in the education system since 1 965 . 
B. Doctrinal Developments 
It is not only the policy context that has changed since Head Start 
was created; the doctrinal context in which federal civil rights legislation 
is created has changed dramatically as well. In the 1 960s, Congress 
played an expansive role in passing civil rights legislation, both by 
developing spending programs designed to promote equity and 
equaliry243 and ' by requiring anti-discriminatory behavior.244 This 
expansive role of Congress was supported by the Supreme Court, which 
consistently upheld challenges to civil rights legislation?-45 More 
broadly, the Supreme Court continually affinned the importance of the 
federal judiciary in civil rights by approving longstanding federal court 
control over desegregation cases,246 rooting the rights of the poor and 
minorities in the federal constitution,247 and expanding the role of the 
240. Id. at 1 74. 
24 1 .  [d. at 1 89 .  
242. Id. at 1 90. 
243. See, e.g. , JAMES T. PATTERSON, AMERICA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST POVERTY 1 900-
1 994 26-98 (Harvard Univ. Press 1 994). 
244. See, e.g. , Civil Rights Act of 1 964, tit. VI, codified at 42 U .S.C. §§ 2000( d) et 
seq. & tit. VII, codified at 42 U S.C. §§ 2000(e) et seq. 
245. See, e.g. , Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 24 1 ,  2 6 1 -62 ( 1 964); 
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 3 05 ( 1 964) (both upholding the Civil Rights Act 
of 1 964). 
246. See, e.g. , Green v. County School Bd., 39 1 U.S. 430, 439 ( 1 968) (stating that 
"the court should retain jurisdiction until it is clear that state-imposed segregation has 
been completely removed"). 
247. See, e.g., Thompson v. Shapiro, 394 U.S. 6 1 8, 64 1 -42 ( 1 969) (striking down 
state welfare law that imposed one-year waiting period before new resident could receive 
welfare benefits on the grounds that it violated the right to travel implicit in the Privileges 
and Immunities Clauses of Article IV and the Fourteenth Amendment); Gideon v. 
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Supreme Court to specify these rights in detail that came close to 
legislating.248 The executive branch of the federal government was also 
powerful in its involvement with civil rights. For example, President 
Kennedy and President Johnson issued important Executive Orders that 
mandated either anti-discrimination or affirmative action, which 
remained undisturbed by the federal judiciary.249 
At the time of Head Start's  inception, then, the primary place for a 
proactive governmental response to civil rights lay in the federal 
government. While Head Start is an anti-poverty program rather than 
anti-discrimination legislation, Head Start was created as part of the civil 
rights movement of the 1 960s. Thus, it is important to see that its 
structure was designed within the standard framework of a now-defunct 
era. F or over the last decade, the Supreme Court has restricted 
Congress 's constitutional authority to enact civil rights legislation under 
two of its main sources of power-Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment250 and the Commerce Clause25 1-a move that has resulted in 
turning over power to the states at almost every turn.252 These 
restrictions collectively frame the atmospherics in which any discussion 
of the allocation of federal or state power takes place. 
As a practical matter, neither of these restrictions directly affects 
Head Start's  existence, stemming as the program does from Congress' s  
Wainwright, 372 U.S .  3 35, 343-45 (1 963) (holding that the Sixth Amendment requires 
that counsel must be provided for a criminal defendant who is too poor to hire his own 
lawyer); Brown v. Bd. of Educ. ,  347 U.S. 483, 495-96 ( 1 954) (holding that the 
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause forbids "separate but equal" 
educational facilities for black and white students); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498-
500 ( 1 954) (holding that Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause incorporates Equal 
Protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment, extending the protection against 
racial discrimination by the federal government). 
248. See, e.g. , Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 ( 1 966) (crafting specific 
requirements for police interrogation of criminal suspects, rooted in the Fifth 
Amendment's protection against self-incrimination). 
249. See, e.g. , Exec. Order No. 1 1 ,  246, 3 C.F.R. 339 ( 1 964- 1 965) (mandating anti­
discriminatory hiring in federal agencies and establishing "affirmative action" 
requirements for federal contractors); Exec. Order No. I I , 063 , 3 C.F.R. 652 (1 959- 1 963) 
(requiring federal agencies to prevent discrimination in federally supported housing). 
250. "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article," including the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection 
Clause. U.S.  CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 .  See City of Boerne v. P.F. Flores, 52 1 U.S. 507, 
535-37 ( 1 997) (striking down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act as invalid Section 5 
legislation and limiting scope of Section 5 authority). 
25 1 .  "The Congress shall have Power . . .  [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign 
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes . . . .  " U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 8. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.  598, 608- 1 2  (2000) (striking down the 
Violence Against Women Act as invalid Commerce Clause legislation and limiting scope 
of Commerce Clause authority). 
252. See, e.g., JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE NATION' S  POWER: THE 
SUPREME COURT SIDES WITH THE STATES (Univ. of Cal. Press 2002). 
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spending power,253 the contours of which have not changed greatly since 
Head Start's creation. Congress may use its spending power only to 
support "the general welfare," but courts should defer to Congress 's 
interpretation of this goal; any conditions Congress imposes on 
acceptance of the funding should be imposed unambiguously and must 
be generally related to the federal interest.254 Additionally, "other 
constitutional provisions may provide an independent bar to the 
conditional grant of federal funds. ,,255 In other words, the conditions 
must be substantively as well as procedurally constitutional. Finally, the 
conditions imposed must not, in comparison to the amount of money 
offered, become coercive.256 It is unlikely that Head Start's existence, 
whether funded as a federal program or a block grant to the states, would 
face a serious challenge under any of these prongs. But even though 
Head Start as a spending program is not directly threatened by retreats in 
Commerce Clause and Section 5 doctrine, it is clear that the heady time 
of broad congressional power to enact federal civil rights legislation is 
gone. 
What may affect Head Start and its compatriots in spending 
programs is a parallel line of Supreme Court cases expanding states' 
immunity from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. While Head Start 
advocates do not explicitly mention this fear in the debates over block 
granting Head Start, there may be cause for concern that transferring 
Head Start to the states would result in no way to enforce the program's  
terms, given this immunity. Here, ironically, there may be an 
opportunity to use this line of otherwise troublesome cases to benefit 
Head Start participants. 
Eleventh Amendment doctrine provides that suits may not be 
brought against unconsenting states.257 The Ex Parte Young doctrine has 
created a legal fiction that allows state officers to be sued as a way of 
getting at state action/58 but this legal fiction allows only suits for 
prospective-Leo injunctive-relief.259 No Ex Parte Young suit for 
retrospective or compensatory relief is available.260 In the last few 
decades, Congress passed legislation rooted in either the Commerce 
253. "The Congress shall have Power To . . .  provide for the common Defence and 
general Welfare of the United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
254. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-08 ( 1 987). 
255. Id. at 208. 
256. Id. at 2 1 1 .  
257. Literally, the Eleventh Amendment provides a state immunity only from suit by 
a citizen of another state, but this immunity has been extended even against suits by an 
individual state's  own citizens. See Hans v. Louisiana, 1 34 U.S. 1 , 2 1  ( 1 890). 
258. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 ,  1 67-68 ( 1 908). 
259. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 65 1 , 675-76 ( 1 974). 
260. ld. 
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Clause or the Civil War Amendments261 attempting to abrogate this 
immunity.262 Congressional abrogation of state immunity would allow 
suits directly against the states and pennit suits for damages as well as 
injunctive relief. In 1 996, however, the Supreme Court rejected 
congressional attempts to use its Commerce Clause (and other Article I) 
powers to abrogate state immunity,263 a conclusion that has been given 
more force in ensuing cases.264 
However, congressionally forced abrogation is not the only path to 
pennitting suits against the states. As the current doctrine stands, while 
Congress may unilaterally abrogate state immunity only under the Civil 
War Amendments, states may choose to waive their immunity by 
consenting to suit.265 This waiver must be explicit and unambiguously 
clear; no constructive waiver or implied consent is acceptable.266 While 
there is some thought that this element of the doctrine may be in flux, 
given the Court 's  cutbacks in other types of congressional power, 
Congress may currently require a state to waive its immunity as a 
condition attached to its spending power.267 If Congress were to recast 
Head Start as a block grant with an explicit requirement that a state 
accepting these funds would waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity 
from suit, program beneficiaries might benefit from an increased ability 
to enforce the program's  terms as well as an ability to receive damages if 
the program is not fully implemented. 
26 1 .  The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments collectively constitute 
the Civil War Amendments. 
262. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 744 ( 1999) (noting recent vintage of 
congressional attempts to abrogate sovereign inununity). 
263. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 5 1 7  U.S. 44, 72 ( 1996) (overruling Pennsylvania 
v. Union Gas Co., 49 1 U.S. 1 ( 1 989» ; Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. 
Coil. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S.  627, 630 ( 1 999). Congress may, however, abrogate state 
inununity under the Civil War Amendments, which the Supreme Court held altered the 
federal-state relation from the allocation of power in the original core of the constitution. 
See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455-57 ( 1976). 
264. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 ( 1 999) (holding that Congress 
cannot abrogate state immunity from suit in state court any more than it could in federal 
court under Article I powers); see also Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.c. State Ports Auth., 535 
U.S. 743, 768-69 (2002) (holding that Congress cannot abrogate state immunity from suit 
under Article I powers in federal administrative agencies). But see Cent. Va. Cmty. Coil. 
v. Katz, 1 26 S .  Ct. 990, 1 005 (2006) (holding that Bankruptcy Clause of Article I 
precludes states from asserting sovereign immunity defense). 
265 . CoIl. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ . Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 
669 ( 1999). 
266. Id. at 680 (overruling Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala. Docks Dep ' t, 377 U.S. 1 84 
( 1 964». 
267. See Rebecca E. Zietlow, Federalism 's Paradox: The Spending Power and 
Waiver of Sovereign Immunity, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1 4 1 ,  167-2 1 5  (2002) 
(characterizing breadth of spending power as "paradoxical" in light of the Court's other 
cutbacks of congressional power in favor of the states, but arguing that this breadth is 
appropriate in the structure of federalism that the Court has been fashioning). 
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The IDEA provides one model of what such a restructuring could 
look like. First, the IDEA contains a sovereign immunity provision, 
stating explicitly that states "shall not be immune under the 1 1  th 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States from suit in Federal 
court for a violation of this title.,,268 Second, the IDEA frames its 
requirements as an individual entitlement-in this case, to a free and 
appropriate public education for students with disabilities-not simply a 
set of activities that states must perform.269 Indeed, the right to a free and 
appropriate public education is so strong that school districts may, in 
certain instances, be required to pay for a child' s  education at private 
school when the public school is not meeting that child' s  needs.270 Third, 
the IDEA contains a mechanism for individual enforcement, first through 
state administrative hearings, with recourse to a federal lawsuit for 
review of the administrative decision.271 It might be possible for Head 
Start advocates to support block grant legislation that framed the 
program's services as an entitlement with individual enforcement 
available.272 
Advocates have assumed that block granting Head Start would 
automatically lead to a loss of accountability without considering 
whether restructuring the legislation could result in an improvement in 
accountability. It is true that banking on a waiver of sovereign immunity 
is not without risk, as the breadth of permissible conditions attached to 
268. 20 U.S.C. § 1 403(a) (2006). While the Courts of Appeal are in general 
agreement that this provision acts as a waiver, it has been noted that the provision is 
actually listed in the statute as an "abrogation" and that there is no specific reference to 
conditioning waiver on receipt of federal funds. See, e.g. , A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Sch., 
34 1 F.3d 234, 244-55 (3d Cir. 2003). A similar provision in a revised Head Start statute 
should take this cautionary observation seriously and "include terms . . .  providing that 
states expressly agree to a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity as a condition for 
[receiving] funding." ld. at 250 n. 1 3 .  
269. 20 U.S.C. § 1 400(d) (2006). See Barnett & Masse, supra note 1 63 ,  at 1 6 1 ,  for 
another articulation of the benefits of offering Head Start-like services as an entitlement. 
270. See Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 5 1 0  U.S. 7, 1 3- 1 4  ( 1993); Sch. 
Comm. of the Town of Burlington, Mass. v. Dep't of Educ. of Mass. ,  471  U.S. 3 59 ,  369 
( 1 985). 
27 1 .  20 U .S.c. § 1 4 1 5(f)-(i) (2006). 
272. Interestingly, litigation on the Medicaid EPSDT program-which has long been 
tied to Head Start, see supra note 1 96 and surrounding text-has sometimes taken the 
structure of individual enforcement through § 1 983 suits against a state deemed to have 
waived its sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 289 F.3d 852, 
860-63 (6th Cir. 2002); see also Zietlow, supra note 267, at n.23 (summarizing cases 
decided both for and against the plaintiff). Head Start advocates should thus be familiar 
with the benefits of this type of enforcement. However, because the Supreme Court has 
made it in<::reasingly difficult to use § 1 983 to enforce spending clause statutes, see, e.g. , 
Sasha Samberg-Champion, Note, How to Read Gonzaga: Laying the Seeds oj a Coherent 
Section 1983 Jurisprudence, 1 03 COLUM. L. REv. 1 838, 1 867-86 (2003), a mechanism 
like that provided in the IDEA, as opposed to reliance on § 1 983, would be preferable for 
a revised Head Start statute intending to provide a private right of action. 
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spending clause authority is uncertain, particularly with the recent 
turnover on the Supreme Court.273 Yet there would still be ways to 
mitigate the risk through carefully drafted legislation. For example, 
notwithstanding the provision on sovereign immunity in the IDEA, the 
most frequent defendants are the local school districts, avoiding the 
problem of state immunity entirely.274 The same could be true in a re­
imagined Head Start context if the statute made the most relevant 
defendants the local service providers. Regardless of the Supreme 
Court's eventual treatment of a waiver of sovereign immunity as a 
permissible use of spending clause authority, then, individual recipients 
of Head Start services would still have some constitutionally available 
defendant to sue. In any event, this proposal for individual enforcement 
of a right to Head Start services is only one example of how the 
seemingly restrictive current doctrine might be used to Head Start's  
benefit. Advocates should seek out other ways to use the evolving 
doctrine as best they can, rather than refuse to explore its possibilities 
because it is not all they hoped for. 
The changes in social welfare policies and doctrinal allocation of 
governmental power described above indicate that it is reasonable to 
examine whether Head Start's basic structure remains the best way to 
organize an early intervention program for poor children so that health, 
education, and welfare outcomes reach a certain level.  Yet it is 
impossible to consider policy changes absent the political structure in 
which they are embedded. As a political issue, however, the question 
changes: if a reconsideration of Head Start's  structure would be 
reasonable and potentially even beneficial to program participants but 
politics keeps it from happening, how can the process move forward? 
The next two sections consider how negotiation theory and practice can 
not only shed light on the current dynamics but also help put in place 
such a process. 
273. See Baker & Berman, Getting off the Dole: Why the Court Should Abandon Its 
Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It To Do So, 78 IND. 
L.J. 459, 46 1 ,  503 (2003) (arguing, even before Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito 
joined the Court, that a Congress that attempted to use the spending power to get around 
the substantive limitations on its power either to regulate or enforce rights against the 
states could and should lead the Supreme Court to revise the spending doctrine). 
274. See, e.g. , U.S. Dep't of Ed., Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative 
Services, Office of Special Education Programs, Part B Procedural Safeguards Notice, at 
1 7-33 (describing for parents the process of filing a complaint alleging the school 
district's failure to provide a free and appropriate public education to their child, and 
indicating that the usual parties are the parents and the school district), available at 
http://www.ed.gov/policy/specedlguidlidea/modelfonn-safeguards.pdf. 
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III. Moving Forward: Opportunities and Barriers Behind an Interest­
Based Process 
A. What is an Interest-Based Process? 
Distinguishing between positional bargaining and interest-based 
bargaining is one of the most basic premises of contemporary negotiation 
scholarship.275 In positional bargaining, the parties frame their goals as 
outcomes, immediately visible results that will make it clear who 
"won.,,276 In interest-based bargaining, by contrast, the parties dig 
beneath their initial positions to discover the basic interests behind them, 
to build a better relationship through better communication, and, ideally, 
to come up with a solution that better meets both parties ' needs and that 
is therefore ultimately more sustainable?77 
It is helpful to frame the current Head Start reauthorization debates 
according to this paradigm. For example, here, the position of the Head 
Start advocates is that the program must remain funded in a federal-local 
stream and must remain under the supervisory authority of HHS .  The 
diametrically opposed position of the administration and the House 
sponsors, at least originally, seems to have been that a block-grant trial 
and more integration with the ED is preferable to the current structure. 
It is harder from the outside of a controversy to detennine what the 
parties' interests are, since the answers to these questions will not always 
be immediately obvious. Now, however, for the purpose of 
demonstrating the importance of discovering the interests that lie behind 
the articulated positions, we can identify at least two different levels of 
potential interests for each set of parties in the dispute over Head Start' s  
structure. At one level, the rhetoric that accompanies the parties' 
position statements indicates some interests.278 Advocates want to make 
sure that children receive comprehensive health services, and they want 
parents to be involved in the program. They want to make sure that the 
neediest children and families will be served. They want to make sure 
that teachers are highly qualified. And they want programs all across the 
country to serve kids equally well. They want these things because they 
feel that children receiving them "are less l ikely to have to repeat grades; 
end up in jail; and are more likely to complete high school, college, and 
275. See ROGER FISHER, WILLIAM URY & BRUCE PATTON, GETTING TO YES: 
NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 3-14, 40-55 (Penguin Books 1 99 1 ), for 
the classic statement of this framework. 
276. See id. at 3- 14. 
277. See id. at 40-55.  
278. Cf NHSA, Legislative Alert, supra note 73 with Press Release, DHHS, supra 
note 1 .  
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have greater earning potential than children not able to participate in the 
program.,,279 Because they feel that the federal government and HHS can 
best meet those interests, they want control of the program to remain 
where it is. 
The administration and House sponsors articulate other interests. 
They want a greater emphasis on school readiness in Head Start 
programs to better prepare poor children for success in school. They 
want preschool programs to be better coordinated with each other and 
with the K- 1 2  school system. They want these things because they feel 
that poor children will demonstrate "improved performance in school" if 
they experience them. 280 B ecause they feel that states and the federal 
education department can best reach these results, they advocate 
changing control of the program. 
At this level, both parties identify some interests that lie behind their 
positions; they just assume that there is a one-to-one overlap between 
interests and positions, whereas in actuality there is no particular reason 
why any one structure is the only way to meet those interests. There is 
also a reasonable amount of overlap between the articulated interests of 
each side. Both parties, for example, want to ensure the success of poor 
children in school and later life; they just differ in how to define and 
reach these goals. Because parties too often focus on their differences to 
their detriment, it is important to note similarities when they appear-not 
to pretend that everybody agrees but because it is often possible to reach 
agreement that satisfies the shared interests while accepting the 
differences as another part of the solution.281  
At another level, the interests of the parties may be a step removed 
from the actual substance of the debate. Perhaps the Head Start 
advocates in 2003 had an interest in defeating Republicans in the 2004 
elections, and so did not want to participate in an act of bipartisanship if 
it would help President Bush ' s  chances of re-election. Perhaps they are 
interested in their standing in the broader advocacy community; having 
protested against these particular changes for so long, they may not wish 
to back down now. The administration and House sponsors too may 
have been thinking about the 2004 election cycle. The President, with an 
interest in being known as the education president, may wish to connect 
Head Start to his signature NCLB to help this image. The President may 
279. NHSA, Legislative Alert, supra note 73. 
280. Press Release, DHHS, supra note I .  
28 1 .  See John Forester, Dealing with Deep Value Differences, in THE CONSENSUS 
BUILDrNG HANDBOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REACHING AGREEMENT 463, 479-87 
(Lawrence Susskind, Sarah McKeaman, & Jennifer Thomas-Lanner, eds., 1 999) 
(describing conflict between citizens and organizations in the state of Colorado en route 
to reaching agreement about how to spend federal money for HIV/AIDS funding). 
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also want to bolster his reputation with those who believe that 
government closer to the people is best, and turning over control of Head 
Start to the states may help counter the impression of the federalization 
of education that NCLB gives. Further, for both the advocates and the 
administration, the symbolic signaling of their relative strength and 
support may matter as much as the substance of the debate itself. 
Whether or not these actually are real interests of the parties, it is 
important to note that there is nothing in interest-based bargaining that 
need be politically naIve. This. is not an issue of effective hardball tactics 
versus mushy, touchy-feely ones. From business deals to policymaking, 
from international treaties to agreements between individuals, interest­
based bargaining can be sophisticated and successful. Paying attention 
to the parties' interests at all levels, from the most public-minded to the 
most self-serving, allows discussion of a broader variety of options that 
may better meet those interests than an either-or strategy will. Interest­
based bargaining offers the opportunity to pay attention to the substance 
behind the rhetoric. 
B. Why is an Interest-Based Process Important Here? 
This article argues that the reauthorization debate over Head Start's 
structure, while rooted in the interests of 1 965, has lost this original 
framework of interest-based bargaining and shifted to a less helpful 
positional bargaining stance. Because the policy and legal context has 
changed over the last forty years such that the expressed positions are no 
longer the only way to achieve the underlying interests, there is value to 
be created by thinking about ways to restructure the program. A more 
useful strategy would focus on the parties' actual interests, which may be 
better served by exploring a multiplicity of options with possibilities for 
joint gain. 
But even if advocates do not accept the argument that there is value 
to be created in changing the program's structure, there is still a strong 
possibility that nominal victories will actually be long-term losses. 
Consider, for example, the advocates '  claimed success in thwarting the 
most recent round of proposed structural reforms, joining a long line of 
examples in which an unyielding party reached his or her goal. 
Especially in cases of perceived moral value-which, given the civil 
rights context in which Head Start was created, advocates use to frame 
the debate-refusal to give an inch may seem l ike the best way 
forward.282 However, it is important to fix the cycle of antagonism 
between the advocates and their perceived opponents in the 
282. See id. at 463-65 (examining the basis for this belief). 
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administration and House because there are ways their perceived 
opponents can have the last word even if nominally the advocates appear 
successful. 
For example, within a month of the Senate committee 's  vote to 
reject the restructuring elements of the House and administration's 
proposals, some House Republicans asked the General Accounting 
Office (GAO)283 to investigate fraud and mismanagement in Head Start 
centers across the country.284 Commenting on this request to the GAO, 
one Brookings Institution fellow said, "If you can trash the old system, 
then people are more willing to try something new. . . .  The welfare 
queen played a role in welfare reform from beginning to end. ,,285 Indeed, 
when the GAO released its report, it found an abundance of fiscal 
improprieties in Head Start programs,286 a result that the House members 
who requested the report treated as a scandal and an outrage.287 While 
the NHSA questioned both the scope of the GAO ' s  findings and the spin 
of the House members,288 the bill that passed the House in fall 2005 was 
"refocused" to address the issue of program mismanagement. 289 It is 
speculation that the request for the GAO report was connected to the 
advocates' opposition to restructuring Head Start, but certainly the House 
sponsors seem to have had the last word on something the advocates 
dislike. Further, if the GAO report lays groundwork for a programmatic 
retreat, any victory for the advocates in thwarting the attempts to 
restructure Head Start will have been pyrrhic indeed. 
The advocates '  opponents may also be able to accomplish their 
objectives even without the statutory structural changes they originally 
wanted. In the fall  of 2003, the Bush administration, acting through 
HHS, began to implement a standardized test to four- and five-year-olds 
in Head Start programs, moving towards the education focus the 
283. On July 7, 2004, the GAO's name changed from the General Accounting Office 
to the Government Accountability Office. See GAO Human Capital Reform Act of 2004, 
Pub. L. No. 1 08-2 7 1 ,  1 1 8 Stat. 8 1 1 (2004). 
284. Diana Jean Schemo, Republicans Urge Inquiry on Head Start, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
26, 2003, at A22. 
285. /d. 
286. See United States Gov't Accountability Office, Head Start: Comprehensive 
Approach to IdentifYing and Addressing Risks Could Help Prevent Grantee Financial 
Management Weaknesses, at 3-4 (February 2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/ 
new.items/d05 1 76.pdf; Greg Winter, Government is Criticized on Oversight oj Head 
Start, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1 8, 2005, at A I O. 
287. See U.S. House Education & the Workforce Committee News Update, 
Independent GAO Report Criticizes Financial Controls in Head Start Program; Says 
ReJorms are Needed to Prevent Financial Abuses that Cheat Children, Taxpayers, and 
Honest Grantees, Mar. 1 8, 2005, available at http ://www.house.gov/ed_workforce/press/ 
press I 09lfirstl03mariheadstart03 1 805 .htm. 
288. See Winter, supra note 286. 
289. See Swindell, 2005 Legislative Summary, supra note 89. 
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administration wished the program to have, to the continued outcry of the 
Head Start advocates.29o Moreover, the advocates object to the current 
Senate bill because it jeopardizes Head Start's longstanding commitment 
to parent participation,29 I and they say that the flat funding of the 
program in fiscal year 2007 is nothing less than the "slow-motion 
demise" of the program.292 Advocates would thus do better by focusing 
on their interest in maintaining Head Start's character as a well-funded 
comprehensive program rather than their position that Head Start must 
remain outside the ED. An example from a previous iteration of the 
block grant wars provides a similar caution. After advocates succeeded 
in derailing the Reagan administration's exploration of block granting 
Head Start in 1 982, the administration was able to accomplish many of 
its deregulatory objectives without formal legislation simply by 
reallocating funds provided for federal oversight to the grantees 
themselves.293 It is not opposition to the block grant per se but their 
actual interests in some kind of federal oversight and programmatic 
standards that advocates should voice. 
In this vein, it is worth recalling Zigler's caution that, to their 
detriment, child care advocates' "vision of the perfect frequently 
becomes the enemy of the good. ,,294 It was the insistence on a federal­
local delivery that led to the downfall of the 1 97 1  Comprehensive Child 
Development Act. 295 Twenty years later, when the next federal child 
care bill finally became law, it was funded much more minimally, 
designed much less comprehensively, and structured as a block grant to 
the states, matching much less closely the expressed interests of the 
advocates in the debates over the 1 97 1  legislation.296 Here, too, the 
advocates ' vision of a perfect Head Start, fought for legislatively and 
temporarily won, may backfire. What if governors and state education 
associations start to lobby for the funding that now goes to Head Start? 
What if the rise in state-level organizing for prekindergarten programs 
290. See NHSA, Issue Brief Head Start National Reporting System, available at 
http://ww .nhsa.orgidownloadiadvocacy/factlHSNRS.pdf. 
29 1 .  See NHSA, Keep Head Start Alive and Well: Key Messages on Senate Head 
Start Bill (Dec. 2005), available at http://www.nhsa.orgldownloadl 
advocacy/Senate_Bill .pdf. 
292. Press Release, NHSA, "Slow-Motion Demise" of Head Start Seen if Congress 
Fails to Add $234 Million to Undo Destructive 2006 Budget Cuts (Apr. 1 1 , 2006), 
available at http://www.nhsa.orgipress/News_Archivediindex_news_04 1 1 06.htm; see 
also Press Release, NHSA, Head Start "Downward Spiral" Seen in Growing Number of 
Program Closures and Painful Cutbacks in Service (June 22, 2006), available at 
http://www.nhsa.prgl press/News_Archivediindex_news_062206.htm. 
293. ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 7, at 1 98 .  
294. [d. at 1 35.  
295. See supra notes 4 1 -49 and accompanying text. 
296. See supra note 1 6 1  and accompanying text. 
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weakens Head Start's independence?297 There is an opportunity now to 
rethink alliances and build relationships to expand Head Start-like 
services for more children, and advocates should not miss the 
opportunity by fighting old wars. Viewing any reauthorization that 
rejects the block grant plan and the move to the ED as a complete victory 
for Head Start advocates is therefore dangerously shortsighted. 
C. Barriers to an Interest-Based Process 
If an interest-based process really would be better, whether for 
value creation or problem avoidance, what is preventing interest-based 
bargaining from taking place in the Head Start reauthorization context? 
Scholarship on conflict resolution helps identify how a common set of 
barriers prevents parties from reaching a negotiated agreement that 
would be better for both sides. 
Strategic barriers. All negotiations contain a tension between 
creating value and distributing it.298 When it comes to creating value, 
parties obtain a benefit from openly sharing their interests and 
preferences. The standard example to demonstrate this point is the battle 
over the orange, where two people each insist on taking as large a share 
of one orange as possible without discussing why either one wants it.299 
They finally agree to cut the orange in half. One person throws away the 
peel and eats the inside of the orange, while the other throws away the 
inside and uses the peel to flavor a cake. If each had shared his interest 
in the orange rather than arguing over who would get more, each could 
have gotten more of what he actually wanted. 
When it comes to distributing value, however, sharing information 
with the other side becomes trickier. If you know what I want, you can 
exploit this knowledge to get a better deal for yourself, as another 
common example illustrates.300 If I have ten apples but prefer oranges, 
297. See, e.g. , Nat'! Sch. Bds. Ass'n, Head Start Reauthorization (Mar. 2006) at 2-3, 
available at http://www .nsba.orglsite/docs/3 5 1 00/3503 7 .pdf (urging Congress to 
strengthen connection between Head Start programs and schools and to allow schools to 
have a role in the design and evaluation of Head Start programs); Joan E. Schmidt, NSBA 
President: A novel idea: aligning federal education laws, SCHOOL BOARD NEWS, Aug. 2, 
2005 ("[i]magin[ing] the potential for improved student achievement if state and local 
jurisdictions had the ability to create meaningful links between Head Start and K-12  
programs" and arguing that "the lack o f  coherence across federal laws and programs 
undermines state and local reform efforts"). 
298. See ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, SCOTT R. PEPPET & ANDREW S. TULUMELLO, BEYOND 
WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 1 1 -43 (The Belknap 
Press of Harvard Univ. Press 2000); Robert H. Mnookin, Why Negotiations Fail: An 
Exploration of Barriers to the Resolution of Conflict, 8 OHIO ST. J .  ON DISP. REsoL. 235, 
239-42 ( 1 993). 
299. See FISHER ET AL., supra note 275, at 56-57. 
300. See, e.g. , Mnookin, Why Negotiations Fail, supra note 298, at 240-4 1 .  
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and you have ten oranges and like both apples and oranges equally, we 
each would be at least as happy by trading fruit on a one-for-one basis. 
But if you know that 1 prefer oranges, you may try to trade one orange 
for two, or three, or ten apples. My disclosure therefore gives you 
power. This tension between openly sharing infonnation to improve the 
deal and keeping infonnation back to improve one's own bargaining 
power is often referred to as the negotiator' s  dilemma.30l Behavior that 
may be rational to get a bigger piece of the pie for one's self may be 
irrational for the best overall outcome.302 
The negotiator's  dilemma helps explain why Head Start advocates 
have been unwilling to enter into an interest-based process with 
congressional decision makers. Taking a hard line against both 
proposals for structural change permits a uniform, coordinated response. 
It is much easier to get Senator Kennedy to say "I oppose any effort to 
block grant Head Start-not in 50 states, not even in one state,,303 than it 
is to get lobbyists and activists all around the country to articulate a 
nuanced response about what framework would need to be in place to 
make state control acceptable. Such a nuanced response might be 
exploited by block grant proponents to make gaining those controls less 
possible; if advocates concede that a block grant might be a fine baseline, 
they might lose bargaining power to implement anything beyond the 
baseline. The nuanced message might be quoted out of context. 
Especially if the nuanced message is not delivered in exactly the same 
way by all the advocates, block grant proponents might feel that the 
opposition was not unified. Entering into an open discussion about how 
a block grant or the ED move might be structured in a way that would 
satisfy the advocates' interests, then, might actually put those interests in 
jeopardy. 
The myth of the fixed pie. The myth of the fixed pie suggests that 
people tend to see the same pot of money or the same narrow set of 
issues as the only thing on the table; the only point of the negotiation, in 
this view, is to divide it.304 This view ignores the possibility that one 
party may want only the inside of the orange while another may want 
only the outside, assuming instead that any deal that makes one party 
more satisfied must automatically lead to the other' s  dissatisfaction. 
Here, the Head Start advocates seem to think that the issue of structural 
control is a win-lose, zero-sum proposition. If proponents of block 
301 .  See DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR 30 
(The Free Press 1 986); Mnookin, Why Negotiations Fail, supra note 298, at 240. 
302. Mnookin, Why Negotiations Fail, supra note 298, at 24 1 .  
303. Swindell & Schuler, supra note 8 1 ,  at 1 895. 
304. MAx BAZERMAN, JONATHAN BARON, & KATHERINE SHONK, You CAN'T ENLARGE 
THE PIE: SIX BARRIERS TO EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT 44-65 (200 1 ). 
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granting want state control, then advocates who have always pushed for 
federal control must automatically lose. This barrier prevents creative 
thinking about how to structure the program so that everyone wins. 
Principal/Agent tension. The principal is the intended beneficiary 
of a given negotiation; the agent is the negotiator working on behalf of 
the principal. 305 Principals use agents in negotiations because they 
provide a lot of benefits: they may have more knowledge , more 
resources, or greater skills.306 They may also provide strategic 
advantages, such as being able to bargain harder than the principals 
themselves would.307 Here, the major Head Start advocacy groups acting 
as agents certainly provide these advantages to the principals they 
represent, whether those principals are the local Head Start service 
providers or the children and family recipients of this service. 
However, the disadvantage to using an agent is that the interests of 
the agent may not be perfectly aligned with those of the principal. 308 
Here, the advocacy organizations may have a broader ideological 
commitment to the fight against state control than Head Start participants 
do, based on a long history of fighting devolution. The advocacy 
organizations as repeat players may feel that they cannot retreat from 
their staked-out positions, while the program participants, as one-time 
players, may feel less bound. Even within the advocacy organizations, 
younger advocates without the personal history of conflict may be more 
willing to explore alternatives but may feel that the professional norm on 
which their future success depends demands that they oppose the 
restructuring proposals without compromise. Some Head Start service 
providers might feel that being more closely connected to the schools 
would be preferable, as salaries for teachers in the public school system 
can be twice as much as salaries in Head Start prograrns.309 Meanwhile, 
some parents might feel that their state might end up doing more for 
them than the current program does, even if other states might not do 
such. a good job.  Further, because parents must deal with twelve years of 
their children' s  education, parents might wish for a closer connection 
between Head Start and schools or have more at stake in using Head 
Start as leverage to transform the education system. Parents might even 
rather receive the $7000 that the government will spend on Head Start 
305. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WrNNING, supra note 298, at 69-9 1 ;  Mnookin, Why 
Negotiations Fail, supra note 298, at 242-43. 
306. MNOOKIN ET AL. ,  BEYOND WINNING, supra note 298, at 7 1 .  
307. [d. at 7 1 .  
308. !d. at 75-76. 
309. See Eloise Pasachoff, Head Start Works Because We Do: Head Start Programs, 
Community Action Agencies, and the Struggle over Unionization, 38  HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REv. 247, 253-54 (2003). 
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for their child as either a direct cash grant or a voucher.3 l O  I t  is easy to 
see how the interests of Head Start advocates and the interests of 
program beneficiaries may not always coincide. 
Cognitive barriers. Cognitive barriers are related to standard 
patterns that underlie decision making.3 1 ! For example, research in 
cognitive psychology suggests that most people are generally risk averse; 
they would rather take a sure thing than gamble on an unknown, even 
where the unknown is potentially more beneficial to them.3 1 2 This 
research further suggests that people are even more loss averse than they 
are risk averse and are thus more likely to gamble to avoid a sure loss 
than to obtain a potential gain.3 1 3  Here, advocates feel that the structural 
changes proposed for Head Start represent a sure loss and are unwilling 
to gamble on the possibility of any benefit. This response is closely 
connected to what other research terms "status quo bias,,3 !4 or 
"endowment effects,,,3 15 where parties tend to prefer something because 
they already have it, regardless of whether they would prefer it to 
something else if they did not have it already. On a blank slate, it might 
make sense to bring state government or the educational establishment 
more into the mix of providing for poor children, but to do so in the 
context of a long history of advocates' opposition to these ideas make 
these changes unappealing. The history itself thus acts as a barrier here, 
with each set of conflicts leading in a path-dependent way to the next. 
Reactive devaluation.  Parties judge proposals not only on their 
abstract merits but also by the context of the offer and their relationship 
with the offeror.3 16 Parties are likely to judge a policy proposal as being 
less favorable when they do not trust its source. Regardless of any 
potential merit in the block grantJED proposals, Head Start advocates 
approached them with doubt and distrust because of a broader discomfort 
with this president and his allies-among them, Dick Cheney and 
Donald Rumsfeld, whom the Head Start advocacy community has long 
seen as unfavorable to Head Start.3 ! 7  It is not that these proposals would 
3 10. See John Hood, Caveat Emptor: The Head Start Scam, in THE HEAD START 
DEBATES, supra note 37, at 508-09 (arguing that Head Start spending per child should be 
converted into grants, vouchers, or tax relief fo� parents to use at the care provider of 
their choice); Blau, supra note 1 85 ,  at 67, 2 1 3  (200 1 )  (discussing value of wage subsidies 
over direct support of child care). 
3 1 1 . Mnookin, Why Negotiations Fail, supra note 298, at 243-46. 
3 1 2. ld. at 243-44; MNoOKIN ET AL. , BEYOND WINNING, supra note 298, at 1 6 1 -64. 
3 1 3. Mnookin, Why Negotiations Fail, supra note 298, at 244; MNOOKIN ET AL., 
BEYOND WINNING, supra note 298, at 1 6 1 -64. 
3 1 4. BAZERMAN, BARON, & SHONK, supra note 304, at 7-8. 
3 1 5 . MNOOKIN ET AL. , BEYOND WINNING, supra note 298, at 1 64-65. 
3 1 6. !d. at 1 65-66; Mnookin, Why Negotiations Fail, supra note 298, at 246-47. 
3 1 7. See supra notes 1 37- 1 38; cf ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 7, at 1 64-65 
(quoting Zigler's analysis of a similar set of doubts with respect to the Nixon 
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have been welcomed if offered by a Democratic administration, but 
certainly this element of mistrust frames the debate, along with the 
connection between previous attempts at block granting the program and 
cutting it and broader civil rights resistance to states' rights and state 
control of anti-poverty programs. 
Identity and emotional barriers.J I S  Psychological realities that 
make individual negotiations or personal conversations difficult are no 
less applicable to a public policy dispute such as the Head Start 
reauthorization, where taking a stand on an issue means identifying with 
a certain set of priorities that define an identity. Here, there would be a 
lot at stake in the advocates' identity if they now went along with the 
block grant or ED proposal after decades of fighting both. Are they 
being duped now?Jl9  Were they being irrational before? They might 
perceive that it would be very difficult for them to explain their change 
of heart to the millions of Head Start farhilies and providers who have 
followed their lead through many administrations. Staying with their 
hard line position gives them no need to save face and allows them to 
remain easily allied with their advocate colleagues, who take a similarly 
hard line. 
Strong emotion plays into this conflict, as well .32o Head Start 
advocates fervently believe in the power of the program. They tell 
personal success stories behind Head Start to bring faces to the numbers. 
When they hear that politicians want to change the program, they hear 
that they are not currently being successful and they feel anger and 
resentment. They rely on using emotional attachment to the program to 
build their powerful grass-roots campaigns that bring phone calls, letters, 
and personal visits to members of Congress supporting Head Start. 
These emotions have contributed to the success · of their lobbying 
campaigns for decades but may limit their inclination to analyze policy 
proposals dispassionately. 
Slippery slope barriers. Negotiation on a small issue that might in 
the abstract be acceptable is often rejected because of the fear that its 
existence is but a slippery slope to disaster.321  Such a barrier is in play 
here. The President's  proposal to make state control available to all fifty 
states was limited in the first House bill to a trial program with eight 
administration' s  offerings). 
3 1 8. See generally DOUGLAS STONE, BRUCE PATION, & SHEILA HEEN, DIFFICULT 
CONVERSATIONS: How TO DISCUSS WHAT MA TIERS MOST 1 1 1 - 1 6  ( 1 999). 
3 1 9. Cf ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 7, at 82 (noting Zigler's fears that the 
Nixon administration had "duped" him, as one of Head Start's founders, into coming to 
Washington to run the program by way of dismantling it). 
320. See STONE ET AL., supra note 3 1 8, at 85-90. 
32 1 .  See generally Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 1 1 6 
HARV. L. REv. 1 026, 1 02 9  (2003).  
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states, but advocates rejected even that small-scale attempt on the 
grounds that it was merely a prelude to block granting and therefore 
destroying the program. Advocates have no incentive to make the 
specifics of a proposed trial program less objectionable because a 
reasonable trial might lead inexorably to an unreasonabl� dismantling. 
The long-tenn, large-scale view makes a short-tenn, small-scale proposal 
untenable. 
Structural barriers. Structural barriers consider the way the 
negotiation process is constructed, including attention to institutional 
factors. 322 At a basic level, the structure of the legislative process itself 
may act as a barrier to interest-based policy development. For example, 
the relevant players-among them Head Start advocates, broader 
childrenlfamily/anti-poverty/civil rights organizations, service providers, 
education representatives, parents, governors, federal and state 
legislators-are dispersed and not all coordinated. They have different 
amounts of power to instigate the agenda.323 Some parties care 
passionately about Head Start reauthorization as their only issue; others 
care about child welfare more broadly; others see Head Start as fitting 
into a broader set of anti-poverty policies; others are responsible for 
winning support from constituents and colleagues on matters relating to 
international trade, homeland security, and tax refonn. It is not only that 
interests may diverge but also that the amount of intensity that the 
relevant parties feel about this issue varies. There is therefore no natural 
impetus to change the way the game works. Further, organizations such 
as the NHSA, whose only mission is Head Start, may be reluctant to 
change a familiar process through which they have experienced some 
success. 
This multitude of barriers gives a sense of the difficulties involved 
in moving beyond the impasse. It should not, however, lead to the 
conclusion that moving beyond the impasse is impossible. Identifying 
and analyzing these barriers, as well as paying attention to the deeply 
rooted history of the conflict, lay the foundation for a way forward. The 
next section builds on this foundation to offer one potential framework 
for an interest-based process. 
322. See ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, LEE Ross, KENNETH J .  ARRow, BARRIERS TO 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION 6-7, 19-23 ( 1 995). 
323. See JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATlVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 1 97-99 
(2d ed. 1 995). 
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IV. Putting an Interest-Based Process in Place 
A. The Role of Consensus Building in Public Policy Disputes 
[Vol. 1 1 1 :2 
Before articulating the steps for an interest-based process in the 
Head Start dispute, it is important to acknowledge respectfully the 
advocates'  concerns about engaging in a conversation about the 
program' s  structure. Advocates understandably feel that such a 
conversation has the potential to harm vulnerable groups, and the 
suggestions that fol low-indeed, the analysis that precedes-is not 
intended to belittle these concerns. Rather, these suggestions attempt to 
provide safeguards for these concerns while developing a process that 
. moves beyond the current stalemate. 
The process that I propose is based on a form of dispute resolution 
called consensus building. Consensus building seeks to involve all of the 
relevant parties in making decisions to better address the parties' 
interests and to reach agreements that have broad-based support and are 
thus more sustainable. In consensus building, different stakeholder 
groups come together to develop and reach agreement on an ongoing 
plan in which all will participate.324 Differences are not ignored; the 
process just assumes that differences on some, even many, issues need 
not stymie agreement on others. Unlike traditional committee-based or 
legislative decision making, where the outcome is often developed by 
one party or set of parties and then delivered to another, and where 
agreement is generally reached by majority-rules voting, consensus­
building processes focus on developing outcomes collectively and 
reaching agreement by consensus. Consensus building avoids the 
adversarial process associated with traditional legislating and lobbying, 
which often misses opportunities to create value because the parties are 
locked into an either-or battle, and which does little to improve the 
parties' working relationships. It is especially useful in highly 
politicized situations where changing the dynamic of the parties ' 
relationship is a key part of the way forward. 
There is a growing movement in public policy-making towards 
using consensus-building processes as a way of resolving large-scale 
multi-stakeholder disputes.  A variety of nonprofit organizations provide 
resources to governments that want to engage in such processes, 
324. See generally LAWRENCE SUSSKIND, SARAH McKEARNAN, & JENNIFER THOMAS­
LARMER, THE CONSENSUS BUILDfNG HANDBOOK ( 1 999). The process I outline in the next 
section is based especially on chapters 1 (Choosing Appropriate Consensus Building 
Techniques and Strategies) and 2 (Conducting A Conflict Assessment). See KINGDON, 
supra note 323, at 1 59-6 \ ,  for more on the importance of consensus building in policy 
decisions. 
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including the Consensus Building Institute, based in Massachusetts, 
which focuses on environmental issues;325 the Keystone Center, based in 
Colorado, whose projects feature environmental issues as well as energy 
policy;326 the National Policy Consensus Center and its affiliate, the 
Policy Consensus Initiative, which work mostly on the issues of health 
care, sustainability, transportation, and watersheds;327 and the Consensus 
Council, Inc. ,  based in North Dakota, which works on issues ranging 
from economic development to the environment to human services.328 
Some states have commissioned their own official consensus 
organizations; the Montana Consensus Council,329 started in 1 994 by 
executive order of the governor, is the most prominent, and eight other 
states also have executive orders promoting fonns of alternative dispute 
resolution, including consensus building, as important mechanisms for 
problem solving.33o Inspire� by the success of these state-level and non­
profit organizations, in 2001 a bipartisan task force framed an outline for 
the U.S. Consensus Council, which Congress would commission to 
address issues that Congress and the White House feel would benefit 
from such a process, especially deadlocked, contentious issues.33 1 In the 
summer of 2003, the Senate Governmental Affairs committee 
unanimously approved a bill supporting the Council, and the Council 
took a step closer to implementation.332 The variety and success of the 
projects facilitated by these organizations should provide encouragement 
for those who may initially be suspicious about the prospects of such a 
process.333 
325. See The Consensus Bldg. Inst., Introduction, http://www.cbuilding.orgl 
consensus/index.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2006). 
326. See The Keystone Ctr., About Us, http://keystone. orgigeneral_sectioniindex.html 
(last visited Aug. 20, 2006). 
327. See Policy Consensus Initiative, http://www.policyconsensus.org/ (last visited 
Aug. 20, 2006). 
32S. See The Consensus Council, Inc., http://www.agree.org/ (last visited Aug. 20, 
2006). 
329. See The Montana Consensus Council, About Us-History and Original 
Executive Order, http://mcc.state.mt.us/aboutlExecutiveOrder.asp (last visited Aug. 20, 
2006). . 
330. See Policy Consensus Initiative, Executive Orders, 
http://www.policyconsensus.orgltools/executiveorders/index.html (last visited Aug. 20, 
2006). 
33 1 .  See The United States Consensus Council, http://www.usconsensuscouncil.orgl 
(last visited Aug. 20, 2006). 
332. [d. ; United States Consensus Council Act of 2003, S. 90S, 10Sth Congo (2003). 
333. In addition to the project descriptions on the websites listed, see supra notes 325-
332, the Consensus Building Handbook contains dozens of case studies where consensus 
building processes were successfully used to resolve public policy problems. See THE 
CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 324, at 85-1 086. 
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B. A Framework for Consensus Building in the Head Start Dispute 
1 .  Starting the Process 
Consensus-building processes are generally initiated either by 
people in leadership positions with a stake in the dispute or by neutral 
parties who are interested in the resolution of the dispute.334 What is 
most important is that the process is  initiated in a way that avoids 
reactive devaluation, where one party will refuse to participate because 
the instigator of the process seems biased.335 In the contentious Head 
Start context, it might be best if a neutral party proposed the process. An 
independent think tank or a center at an academic institution would be an 
appropriate convenor, reaching out to ask stakeholders to participate in 
such a process, or contracting with a professional consensus-building 
organization to do the same. Alternatively, interested parties in the form 
of either government players or advocacy groups could initiate the 
process. If the idea for consensus building were to come from Congress, 
it could be written into the Head Start legislation, commissioning a report 
to Congress within a year or so, in time for the next reauthorization. The 
process might also be initiated by advocates or practitioners who 
recognize that opportunities for positive change are being missed. Two 
neutral parties could also initiate the process together, demonstrating 
stronger institutional support for the process from the start. Any of these 
possibilities for instigating the process could work. The challenge with 
all will be to maintain both appearance and reality of interest in a new 
way of communicating and decision making. 
2.  Performing a Conflict Assessment 
After the process is initiated, the convening group should hire a 
neutral party to conduct a conflict assessment, reaching out individually 
to the stakeholders to identify issues of importance; ensure that everyone 
with a stake is involved; establish that it makes sense to proceed with the 
process; and determine what specific details will make the process best 
meet the parties' needs.336 Conducting a conflict assessment is important 
for a number of reasons. Without a conflict assessment, important 
stakeholders might be left out and issues might be missed or framed in a 
334. See Susan Carpenter, Choosing Appropriate Consensus Building Techniques and 
Strategies, in THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 324, at 63. 
335. See supra notes 3 1 6-3 1 7  and accompanying text. 
336. Lawrence Susskind & Jennifer Thomas-Larmer, Conducting a Conflict 
Assessment, in THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 324, at 99, 1 00. 
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way that would prove unhelpful.33? The conflict assessment avoids the 
pitfall of trying this new way of interacting but doing it wrong, making 
relationships more acrimonious.338 It also helps the parties build trust 
with the neutral, which can then lead to respect for the process.339 
Finally, the neutral can translate the parties ' initial ideas about the 
process into impartial language, which can avoid an unnecessary battle 
over framing the issues from the start.340 The conflict assessment plays 
an important role in making sure first that the process should go forward 
and then that it does go forward in the most helpful way possible. 
While the conflict assessment will produce a more specific list of 
necessary stakeholders, it is worth emphasizing that the pool of 
stakeholders should be conceptualized broadly. Given the fragmented 
way the system of early care and education in this country has developed 
over the last forty years, and given the potential for more connections 
among the parties, it is important that, at this moment of 
reconceptualizing service delivery, the process be very inclusive. A first 
cut at the relevant stakeholders from within the Head Start community 
might include the NHSA, the Head Start Bureau, state collaboration 
offices, executive directors of Head Start programs, teachers and staff in 
Head Start programs, Head Start parents, and former Head Start children. 
Perhaps an early leader of Head Start, such as Edward Zigler, could be 
involved. Additional stakeholders might include representatives from 
governors' offices, state departments of education, members of the child 
advocacy and child care communities, early education teachers and 
researchers, Community Action Program leaders, children's  health 
workers, welfare activists, and human resource directors at a variety of 
employers, as well as some staff to members of Congress. 
Designing the process to involve so many stakeholders attempts to 
respond to several barriers articulated above. First, involving more 
people may reduce the principal-agent tension,341 as a greater variety of 
voices may lead to less presentation of the party line and a more honest 
exploration of potential decisions. Second, the process may also respond 
to identity/emotion barriers.342 Collaboration with child welfare 
advocates is already a central part of the Head Start advocates'  identity, 
and this process allows them to expand their collaborative work and 
allows trust to develop within working groups such that controversial 
proposals may be discussed collectively. Finally, the inclusion of so 
337. Id. at 1 05.  
338. Id. 
339. Id. at 1 04. 
340. Id. 
341 .  See supra notes 305-3 1 0  and accompanying text. 
342. See supra notes 3 1 8-320 and accompanying text. 
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many stakeholders also attempts to respond to reactive devaluation.343 If 
the broader advocacy world is involved, there is less of a chance that the 
Head Start community will feel threatened and refuse to participate, and 
VIce versa. 
Note that some reluctance on the part of the stakeholders to 
participate in the process need not doom it. 344 Stakeholders with little 
experience with consensus building and with a long history of 
antagonism may feel  skeptical about the potential the process holds. 
Participating in the initial stakeholder interviews can be one way to 
overcome some of the reluctance; initial participation can also 
demonstrate to a skeptical party that some success may be reached. Of 
course, if many major players consistently refuse to participate, the 
process may not go forward. On the other hand, if the process goes 
forward anyway, reluctant stakeholders may decide to participate, since 
their views will not be represented if they do not. 
The conflict assessment should result in a report to the convenors 
and the interviewees describing and analyzing the findings of the 
assessment and making recommendations about how the consensus­
building process should proceed. 
3 .  Structuring the Process 
Because structuring the process that the consensus building will  
follow is something that should be done with the parties, this section 
, only outlines generally what such a process might look like and explains 
how elements of the process could respond to the barriers to interest­
based agreement articulated above. 
Defining the Problem.345 Instead of a limited, contentious 
question-such as "Should Head Start be turned over to the states and 
the Department of Education?"-a broad, open-ended question should 
frame the process. For example, the participants could be charged with 
rethinking the current system of early education, care, and health and 
social services for young children and their families, developing ways 
that government can facilitate the provision of these services, with a 
special focus on at-risk children and families but also attending to the 
needs of children from working- and middle-class families. Framing the 
problem as broad instead of narrow attempts to respond to the barrier of 
status quo bias or endowment effects;346 while Head Start advocates may 
initially be unwilling to agree to any change to their own singled-out 
343. See supra notes 3 1 6-3 1 7  and accompanying text. 
344. See Susskind & Thomas-Larmer, supra note 336, at 1 1 9-20. 
345. See Carpenter, supra note 334, at 76. 
346. See supra notes 3 1 4-3 1 5  and accompanying text. 
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program, they generally agree that the current system is inadequate. A 
larger question would allow the process to start from the premise that 
some agreement is possible. 
Articulating Goals and a Potential Outcome.347 A goal for the 
outcome of the process is not a substantive result, but an end product of 
the group' s  work. A report to Congress presenting the group's findings 
and recommendations would be one sensible option. So would reports to 
each state, available to the public at large. These reports, collaboratively 
agreed upon, would respond to the negotiator's  dilemma, the tension 
between the benefits to and the drawbacks of openly sharing 
information.348 Since the reports would be consensus documents, 
nothing can be released that does not have all of the participants '  
blessing. It will b e  easier for advocates to share information i n  small 
pieces and develop trust in a coordinated working group than to 
demonstrate anything less than a hard line in uncoordinated lobbying 
sessions. 
IdentifYing and Including Participants.349 Because the number of 
potential participants is likely too high for there to be open participation, 
representative participation makes sense, but all potential stakeholders 
should feel that their voices and interests are being represented in the 
consensus group. The consensus group should also plan how the 
representatives will communicate with their constituents.35o For 
example, the consensus group could create additional advisory boards,35 1  
or hold a series of sessions from state to state with open invitations to 
everyone with an interest and a stake in the matter. 
Logistical Choices and Ground Rules.352 The group will need to 
decide, among other things, when the group(s) will meet, over what time 
period, how often, where, how conversation will proceed both at and in 
between meetings, and what roles will be assigned to group members. 
At this theoretical stage, it is impossible to provide many details on what 
specific decisions should be made. It is worth mentioning, however, that 
it would be best if the process does not take place entirely in a hotel , 
conference room in Washington, D.C. Instead, the sessions should take 
place around the country and should ideally involve site visits to 
programs and agencies.353 
Defining a General Approach to Building Consensus. Practitioners 
347. See Carpenter, supra note 334, at 77. 
348. See supra notes 301 -304 and accompanying text. 
349. See Carpenter, supra note 334, at 9 1 -93. 
350. See id. at 88-89. 
35 1 .  See id. at 86-87. 
352. See id. at 79-8 1 , 96-97. 
353. See id. at 86, 97. 
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distinguish among several types of consensus-building processes: ( 1 )  "a 
conventional problem-solving approach," where participants frame the 
problem and come up with solutions; (2) an approach that involves 
working with a single-text document, where the parties collectively 
revise a working draft of an agreement document; and (3) "a visioning 
approach," where parties move through the questions "What do we 
have?" "What do we want?" and "How do we get there?,,354 The nature 
of the task at hand-a broad reconceptualizing of the current system of 
early care and education-suggests that a visioning approach would be 
most useful. The visioning approach can be thought of as akin to the 
committee that originated Head Start in 1 965, creating something out of 
nothing by thinking big. The approach also usefully helps participants 
focus on interests, since behind the question "What do we want?" should 
always lie a series of questions that ask "Why?" Thinking about the 
future also gets people away from being trapped in the positions of the 
present, responding to the myth of the fixed pie.355 
Educating the Parties. 356 This phase of the process puts on the 
agenda time for parties to l isten to each other in the knowledge that each 
party will have its turn. The first challenge is to focus on interests rather 
than positions. For Head Start advocates, this will mean focusing not on 
why state control of Head Start would be bad or why Head Start must not 
move to the ED but instead on what interests Head Start's current 
structure speaks to and why those interests are important in any future 
system. It will also mean listening to other stakeholders' interests and 
trying to find ways in which those interests either overlap or differ in 
ways that could be usefully l inked.357 This phase attempts to respond to 
the negotiator's dilemma,358 since sharing interests and information as 
part of an ongoing conversation in a working group is comparatively 
low-risk. This phase also responds to loss/risk aversion, status quo bias, 
and endowment effects,359 because nothing is given up at the outset, and 
there is no foreordained conclusion that the current structure will be 
found lacking. 
Developing Options.360 Depending on how the consensus group is 
structured, it may be more useful for sub-groups or smaller task forces to 
generate options around different sets of proposals, or it may be more 
354. See id. at 77-79. 
355. See supra note 304 and accompanying text. 
356. See Carpenter, supra note 334, at 8 1 .  
357. See, e.g. , LAX & SEBENIUS, supra note 301 , at 90- 1 06, for more on how to use 
differences in interests to create joint gain. 
358. See supra notes 301 -304 and accompanying text. 
359. See supra notes 3 1 1 -3 1 5  and accompanying text. 
360. See Carpenter, supra note 334, at 8 1 -82. 
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useful for the group at large to develop these options. This could also be 
a time to use a single-text document for the parties to revise 
collaboratively. For example, parties could construct state-level plans 
for more involvement in Head Start by integrating programs across the 
state, inserting safeguards and requirements that Head Start advocates 
would find acceptable. This phase helps overcome the structural barrier 
of the legislative process because stakeholders need not ultimately 
support an option they work on generating,36I while in contrast, 
stakeholders with limited input into the legislative process may feel 
reluctant to engage with disfavored options for fear that they will be seen 
to agree with them. Option generating also responds to the negotiator's 
dilemma because its framing as a collaborative discussion rather than a 
presentation of a position to a final decision maker allows for true 
brainstorming without sacrificing anything.362 
Reaching and Implementing Agreements.363 Consensus building 
may use a wide variety of ways of reaching agreement. Participants may 
make decisions according to an agreed-upon set of criteria; they may 
reach agreement one issue at a time or develop a series of packages; they 
may establish priorities and trade among them. After deciding on the 
method, stakeholders may reach any of a number of actual agreements, 
from more state coordination with no federal changes to massive federal 
changes with specific protections in place to ensure that stakeholders' 
interests are met (for example, that programs continue to have high levels 
of parent involvement and comprehensive services, to take an issue of 
importance to Head Start advocates) . Developing this series of systems 
might lead to meeting the interests of the current proponents of major 
structural reform without actually doing any major federal restructuring, 
or it might allow major federal restructuring to take place in a way that 
will be palatable to Head Start advocates. It is impossible to say from 
the outset; developing the system options is part of the process of 
reaching agreement. 
4. Overcoming Potential Problems 
There are no guarantees that this process will work. The parties 
could refuse to come together or refuse to engage in the process fully. 
The stakeholders' internal constituencies could feel betrayed and 
pressure the stakeholders to stick firmly with positions or to drop out of 
the process. The slippery slope and structural barriers are especially hard 
36 1 .  See supra notes 301 -304 and accompanying text. 
362. See id. 
363. See Carpenter, supra note 334, at 82-84. 
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to get around,364 since engaging in a process like this reveals some 
willingness to change that could be exploited, and since the legislative 
process-which must eventually be involved if statutory changes are 
envisioned-allows issues to be traded and coalitions to shift. It is 
important not to underestimate the potential problems involved with 
setting up a consensus-building process. 
On the other hand, it is also important not to assume that these 
problems are insurmountable. For example, regardless of whether the 
process stems from a think tank, academic institution, advocates, or 
Congress itself, politicians who are proponents of changing Head Start's  
basic structure may feel able to support this process. A process designed 
in part to consider changing the structure of government involvement in 
early education and care might allow proponents of block granting to feel 
that they have made at least some progress toward their goal. Legislating 
the existence of this process may put possible structural changes on the 
table more seriously than they have ever been before. Ever mindful of 
elections, politicians may support the process to have another 
accomplishment to point to, especially if protest from the Head Start 
advocacy community would otherwise hurt them. 
It will likely be harder to gain support for this process from Head 
Start advocates for a host of reasons already discussed. Crafted 
correctly, however, with a broad set of participants, enough trusted Head 
Start leaders supporting the process, and a mandate that the process has 
no pre-ordained conclusion, this process may win support. If it seems 
like the process stems from Congress as a replacement for mandating a 
restructured Head Start, advocates may feel that they are on safer ground. 
Advocates may also realize that successfully derailing proposals for 
structural reform may not result in a long-term victory, given the number 
of ways that the effects of structural change can be achieved by going 
around the nonnal legislative process. Further, advocates need give 
nothing up in order to participate in the process; there are no 
commitments involved in brainstorming; and the idea of consensus-based 
decision making should alleviate fears of being outvoted, since everyone 
must agree to the final outcome. 
Indeed, notwithstanding potential concerns about opening up 
discussions regarding structural reform, the recent history of Head Start 
suggests that Head Start advocates might be willing to participate in such 
a process. In 1 993 , the Secretary of HHS formed a diverse and 
bipartisan Advisory Committee on Head Start Quality and Expansion, 
bringing together forty-seven individuals from the Head Start 
community, various government offices, the private sector, and the field 
364. See supra notes 3 2 1 -323 and accompanying text. 
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of children' s  health and education, tasked with creating a vision for a 
2 1  st Century Head Start.365 While not framed as a consensus-building 
process, the Advisory Committee reached unanimous agreement on a 
report (that called for, among other things, increased partnerships among 
all levels of government and across a variety of programs )366 whose 
conclusions were subsequently reflected in the 1 994 Head Start 
reauthorization.367 Now, a dozen years later, on the other side of welfare 
refonn and the creation of the Child Care and Development Fund, and in 
the wake of the first presidential and congressional proposals for 
structural reform since the Reagan administration, advocates may agree 
that the time is right for another group to convene. In the current 
climate, mu'ch more heated than in 1 993, a consensus-building process 
holds value. 
Notwithstanding this logic, advocates may still refuse to participate 
in a consensus process on the theory that discussing the options behind 
structural change is one foot in the door to mandating them. Eugene . 
Volokh calls this the "slippery slope inefficiency," where socially 
optimal outcome A is bypassed because of pressure from advocacy 
groups who fear that it may lead to undesired outcome B.368 Prof. 
Volokh suggests that one way around the inefficiency is for each side 
(assuming there are characterizable sides) to both win and lose 
something (assuming there are identifiable victories and losses).369 In 
this way, outcome A is not easily reducible to a victory or loss for either 
side, requiring legislators to understand the nuances of outcome A rather 
than reducing it to a bullet-point that makes one side seem politically 
stronger; the slippage from outcome A to outcome B thus becomes more 
difficult.370 There might be a way, he says, for opposing interest groups 
that have continuing relationships with legislators and with each other to 
find a way to craft mutually satisfactory agreements that avoid these 
inefficiencies that the voting public could otherwise not.371 A consensus­
building process would seem to provide such an opportunity. Prof. 
365. See Creating a 2 1 st Century Head Start: Preface, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/ 
programslhsb/researchl2 13entury/preface .htm (last accessed Aug. 26, 2006); 
Biographical Sketches of Committee Members, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ 
hsb/researchl2 1_centurylbio_sketches.htm (last accessed Aug. 26, 2006). 
366. See Forging New Partnerships, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programslhsb/ 
researchl2 l3entury/partnerships.htm (last accessed Aug. 26, 2006). 
367. See Testimony of Olivia Golden Before the Committee on Education and the 
Workforce, U.S. House of Representatives, Apr. 5, 2005, http://www.house.gov/ 
ed_ workforcelhearingsll 09thlfclheadstart040S0S/golden.htm (last accessed Aug. 27, 
2006). 
368. See Volokh, supra note 32 1 ,  at 1 1 26. 
369. [d. at 1 1 26-27. 
370. [d. 
37 1 .  [d. at 1 1 3 1 -32. 
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Volokh also suggests that advocacy groups who might reasonably 
respond to outcome A with an ad hominem attack against its supporters 
(who also want outcome B) might find their public perception tarnished 
by this "too partisan or even ill-mannered" attack.372 According to this 
theory, advocates' refusal to participate in a consensus-building process 
that clearly has no mandate to come out a certain way and that is open to 
broad participation from the Head Start community may be harder to 
spin as a dangerous step on the slippery slope. Additionally, as to the 
specifics of any plan the process might create, advocates will be in a 
better position to ensure that any small-scale trial of structural change 
has enough safeguards that it will not proceed inexorably to change the 
entire structure nationwide. 
Structural barriers with the legislative process still remain. For 
example, even if Congress agrees to follow the results of the consensus 
process, it cannot bind future Congresses to that effect. Nothing 
guarantees that the consensus agreement produced would not be selected 
in bits and pieces, when only the whole document represents what the 
parties feel comfortable with. On the other hand, the broad array of 
stakeholder participants may lessen the chance that Congress would 
eventually pass something contrary to the advocates' interests as 
expressed in the consensus agreement, since more than simply the Head 
Start community would likely feel betrayed if Congress bypasses the 
consensus agreement. This answer is not entirely satisfying, however, 
and it is clear that some risk may be involved. 
My responses to these potential problems are not meant to be glib; 
certainly these are real concerns. The conflict assessment should pay 
special attention to them before suggesting that the process continue. 
Yet despite these potential problems, the process still presents an 
opportunity for long-term success. 
Conclusion 
"Every change that we proposed in Head Start met with great 
resistance at both the federal and local level, but later people came to 
adopt the idea as their own," recalls Edward Zigler, thinking about his 
days running Head Start in the early 1 970s.373 He was speaking in 
particular about a proposal to serve children with disabilities in Head 
Start, a proposal that ultimately made it into law over the opposition of 
some Head Start staff. He goes on to explain why Head Start was more 
successful at serving disabled children than the public schools were: at 
the time of the proposal to serve disabled children in Head Start, "the 
372. [d. at 1 1 27. 
373. ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 7, at 1 63.  
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schools ha[d] never really been forced to adopt a mainstreaming strategy. 
But Head Start did not have the option to place children with special 
needs in a classroom by themselves down the hall.,,374 
This example demonstrates not that Head Start is necessarily more 
successful than the schools are at serving this target population but that 
legislation matters. When legislation required Head Start programs to 
serve disabled children, they did, and they did it well. Rather than 
objecting to structural proposals for Head Start, then, advocates should 
instead think about what their underlying interests are and how the 
proposals can be crafted to meet them. The example also reminds us that 
Head Start has been in flux since its creation and that aspects of the 
program we now take for granted were controversial when they were 
first introduced. Resistance to large-scale change is natural because it 
brings the unknown, which especially in certain political climates can 
feel threatening. But perceiving structural change as only dangerous is a 
limited view. 
The recurring debate over the funding and structure of Head Start is 
framed too narrowly as an either-or proposition: dismantle Head Start as 
we know it or maintain its structure and increase its funding. This focus 
on value distribution misses the opportunity for value creation and keeps 
the players stuck in a cycle of negative history and unproductive 
relationships .  Analysis of the opportunities for change, the barriers that 
prevent change, and the potential for an interest-based process helpfully 
changes the debate. This analysis leads to two observations. First, it 
would not be impossible to change Head Start' s basic structure in a way 
that would help, not hurt, its target population, and Head Start advocates 
should acknowledge this possibility. More importantly, moving from the 
current mode of combative, positional lobbying, which may undercut the 
long-term success of the program, to an interest-based consensus-and 
coalition-building process may again provide better results for the target 
population. 
As the movement for early childhood education and care gains force 
around the country, a policy window is opening for a strengthened 
nationally supported system in which Head Start can play an important 
role.375 Head Start advocates should take the opportunity to imagine the 
possibilities of a reshaped system, not to fear change. 
374. Id. at 1 63-64. 
375. See KINGDON, supra note 324, at 1 65-95. 
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